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Abstract 
 
Although VATs applied simultaneously within the same country by different levels of 
government were long considered to be either undesirable or infeasible, two quite different types 
of sub-central VATs – regional consumption taxes and local business taxes -- now exist in a 
number of countries.  Brazil, Canada, and India have introduced regional (state and provincial) 
VATs which, like national VATs, are general taxes on consumption administered through a 
transaction-based credit-invoice approach.  Although these three countries are very different, and 
each has established such a tax for its own reasons in different ways and with varying degrees of 
success, as this paper discusses, on the whole such regional VATs appear to work fairly well, 
especially in Canada.  
The issues that arise with independent regional VATs are closely related to those arising with 
national VATs in a common market such as the EU.  A number of problems such as ‘carousel’ 
(or ‘missing trader’) fraud have recently received considerable attention in the EU and a variety 
of alternative solutions to such problems have been suggested, some involving major structural 
changes in the VAT.  Experience with regional VATs, however, suggests that what is needed to 
resolve most such problems is primarily a firmer ‘EU-wide’ framework for improving VAT 
administration. 
The second type of sub-central VAT that has recently emerged in Italy, Japan, and France (as 
well as in several U.S. states) takes the form of a revised form of local business tax which is 
generally imposed on an ‘income’ (origin) basis in contrast to the destination-based consumption 
VATs discussed earlier. These taxes seem superior in some important respects to other forms of 
local business taxation and appear to be compatible with both regional and national VATs.   
Although important economic and administrative aspects require careful consideration in 
designing and implementing ‘two-level’ (dual) VATs, such dual VATs (or even triple VATs, 
including an ‘income-type’ VAT at the local level) are evidently both feasible technically and 
acceptable politically.  This conclusion does not mean that regional VATs are either inherently 
desirable or necessarily the best alternative for any country (or set of countries). But it does 
suggest that such taxes may work more satisfactorily in at least some countries than other forms 
of regional sales taxes or local business taxes.  Indeed, both varieties of ‘decentralized VATs’ 
discussed here may become more important over time.   
 
Keywords: VAT, local business taxation, common market, subnational taxation 
 
JEL Codes: H25, H71, H77, F36 
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Introduction 
 
Since the most striking tax development of the last half century has been the worldwide rise 
of the value-added tax (VAT), it is no surprise that most countries now have national VATs 
(Martinez-Vazquez and Bird 2011).  More surprisingly perhaps, two quite different types of 
sub-central VATs – regional consumption taxes and local business taxes -- now exist in a 
number of countries.  Can two (or even three) levels of government tax essentially the same 
base without creating undesirable tax competition, giving rise to unnecessary administrative 
and compliance costs,  and requiring an unattainable level of intergovernmental cooperation?  
 
VATs applied simultaneously within the same country by different levels of government 
were long considered to be either undesirable or infeasible.  One reason was because of the 
high administrative and compliance costs of imposing two sales taxes on the same base. 
Another was that divided jurisdiction over such an important tax base might unduly limit the 
scope of central macroeconomic policy.  Still another was simply because central 
governments were reluctant to allow others a share in this attractive tax base.  However, the 
major technical problems perceived were undoubtedly those arising from cross-border trade 
and the need for border adjustment. 
   
National taxes in a common market are analytically analogous to sub-central taxes within a 
country, so it is no surprise that most of these issues were first discussed in detail in the early 
years of European integration (Shoup 1967).  The dominant view emerging from this 
discussion was that the only way in which sub-central units could effectively levy a VAT 
was on an origin basis and that unless they did so at uniform rates the results would be highly 
distortionary (Neumark 1963).  The only way to impose acceptable origin-based sub-central 
VATs was thus in effect by giving up the fiscal autonomy (and accountability) that such 
taxes might otherwise provide to sub-central governments.
1
  On the other hand, since it was 
generally thought that a destination-basis consumption VAT could be effectively imposed 
only through the invoice-credit method it seemed that such a tax could not be successfully 
implemented without physical border controls.  In the absence of borders, the early 
discussion of this issue in the context of the European common market generally concluded 
that the only feasible approach would be some form of ‘clearing house’ in which transaction-
based input tax credits and tax liabilities could be netted against each other, with any 
remaining balance being settled by interstate payments. But this approach was considered 
costly to administer and politically difficult to implement.
 2
  Summing up, sub-central VATs 
were generally considered to be distortionary if levied on an origin basis and unworkable if 
levied on a destination basis. 
 
Despite such problems, several large federal countries – Brazil, Canada, and India – have 
introduced regional (state and provincial) VATs which, like national VATs, are general taxes 
on consumption administered through a transaction-based credit-invoice approach.  Although 
                                                 
1
 The importance of such accountability and the role potentially played by ‘decentralized’ VATs in achieving it is 
discussed in Bird (2011). 
2
 For discussions of these issues, see Neumark (1963), Shoup (1967), Cnossen and Shoup (1987), OECD (1988), 
and Poddar (1990).  An interesting example of a clearing-house arrangement has long existed between Israel and 
West Bank-Gaza, although the flow of revenues has proved to be vulnerable to political factors. 
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these three countries are very different, and each has established such a tax for its own 
reasons in different ways and with varying degrees of success, on the whole such regional 
VATs appear to work fairly well, especially in Canada.  Even imperfect regional VATs such 
as those in Brazil and India are less economically distorting than the taxes they replaced – 
gross receipts taxes in Brazil and pre-retail stage sales taxes in India – while being little or no 
more difficult to administer.
3
   The experience in Canada, where regional VATs (which 
successfully deal with border problems through the so-called ‘transitory’ deferred-payment 
system long used in the European Union have largely replaced retail sales taxes (RSTs) has 
been generally good.
4
  Section 2 discusses the experience with these regional VATs in some 
detail as well as other approaches to ‘decentralizing’ central VATs found in some countries. 
 
As mentioned, the issues that arise with independent regional VATs are closely related to 
those arising with national VATs in a common market such as the EU.  Section 3 reviews a 
number of problems that have recently received considerable attention in the EU context 
such as ‘carousel’ (or ‘missing trader’) fraud.  A variety of alternative solutions to such 
problems have been suggested for the EU, some involving major structural changes in the 
VAT.  As Canadian experience suggests, however, it appears that the problems with EU 
VATs on the whole call for administrative rather than structural solutions.  Section 3 
concludes with some suggestions on how a firmer ‘EU-wide’ framework for improving VAT 
administration may perhaps be achieved.  
 
Section 4 turns to the rather different story of how decentralized local ‘business VATs’ have 
recently emerged in several countries.  Interestingly, VAT was first conceived of in both 
Germany and the United States as a way of taxing business (Sullivan 1965).  It is thus 
perhaps only fitting that the second type of sub-central VAT, which has emerged in recent 
years in Italy, Japan, and France (as well as in several U.S. states), has taken the form of a 
revised form of local business tax.  In contrast to the consumption (destination) VATs that 
dominate in the world, these local business VATs are usually levied on an ‘income’ (origin) 
basis, which of course raises some of the same analytical questions mentioned earlier about 
such taxes.  Section 4 concludes with a brief discussion of how such local business VATs 
may relate to regional and national VATs.  
 
As the concluding Section 5 suggests, the varied national experiences discussed here 
demonstrate clearly that, although important economic and administrative aspects require 
careful consideration in designing and implementing ‘two-level’ (dual) VATs, in some 
circumstances such dual VATs (or even triple VATs, including an ‘income-type’ VAT at the 
local level) are evidently both feasible technically and acceptable politically.  This 
conclusion does not imply that regional VATs are either inherently desirable or necessarily 
the best alternative for any country (or set of countries). But it does mean that such taxes may 
work more satisfactorily in at least some countries than other forms of regional sales taxes or 
                                                 
3
 See, for example, the discussion in Artana et al. (2012).  This study evaluates the effects of alternative forms of 
provincial sales taxes in Argentina (which now has a gross receipts tax) and concludes that a provincial VAT would 
be economically preferable.  
4
 For example, Smart and Bird (2009) show that empirical evidence in Canada supports the conclusion that a 
provincial VAT is better from a growth perspective than a provincial retail sales tax. 
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local business taxes.  Moreover, some of the lessons learned from experience with regional 
VATs seem applicable to a common market such as the EU.  Similarly, while local business 
VATs like those discussed here may not be suitable for all countries, countries facing 
problems in financing local public services, especially in large metropolitan areas, would 
seem well advised to consider the possible role of such taxes.  On the whole, both varieties of 
‘decentralized VATs’ discussed here may well become more common and more important  
around the world as time goes on.   
 
 
1. Decentralizing the VAT 
 
Most countries have avoided the complications of decentralizing VATs by the simple 
expedient of keeping VAT central.  However, a number of countries, both federal and 
unitary, have in effect ‘decentralized’ the VAT to varying degrees in a number of different 
ways.  For example, some countries such as Germany and Morocco direct a specified share 
of VAT collections to regional governments, often on the basis of a formula based on such 
factors as population and poverty.  Even more countries, like Argentina and Colombia, have 
similar formula transfers with the ‘pool’ of funds transferred being established as some 
percentage of all central tax collections, including VAT.  China attempts to allocate the 
provincial share of VAT on a ‘derivation’ (origin) basis, as did Russia for a time.5 Other 
countries, such as Spain and Japan, allocate the local share on the basis of estimated ‘final’ 
consumption in the local jurisdiction, a system that was suggested for the EU some years ago 
(Commission 1996).  Finally, countries such as Portugal and Mexico apply different rates in 
particular territories for administrative or incentive reasons.
6
 
 
Seventeen of the 20 federal countries listed in Table 1 have central VATs (of varying scope) 
with standard rates ranging from 5 percent in Canada and Nigeria to 21 percent in Argentina 
and (on a tax-exclusive basis) 25 percent in Brazil.
 7
   Most of the approaches just mentioned 
may be illustrated by these countries. 
                                                 
5
 If the revenues of a nationally uniform VAT are shared on the basis of origin, much the same undesirable and 
distortionary incentives are created as in the case of non-uniform sub-central origin-based VATs. As Baer, 
Summers, and Sunley (1996) emphasize, when the central VAT is actually administered by sub-central 
governments, these problems are accentuated, which is one reason the VAT in Russia is now centralized (Martinez-
Vazquez, Rider and Wallace 2008).  Although VAT administration is centralized in China, its system of sharing the 
revenues still gives rise to allocative and incentive problems (Wong and Bird 2008). 
6
 For a more detailed discussion of ‘decentralized’ VATs in OECD countries, see Bird (2010). 
7
 Not all the countries listed in Table 1 are formally constitutionally federal e.g. Spain and South Africa, but all 
operate in a sufficiently federal way to be considered as such here. The Forum of Federations (www.forumfed.org) 
lists four other ‘federal’ countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Comoros Islands, Micronesia, and St.Kitts-Nevis, as 
well as two additional countries considered (perhaps optimistically) to be “in transition to federations” – Iraq and 
Sudan.  
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Table 1 
VAT in Federal Countries 
(1) 
 Country 
(2) 
Population 
(million) 
(3) 
 GDP 
Per 
Capita 
(US$’000) 
(4)  
Central VAT 
(standard 
rate) 
(5) 
Special 
Territorial 
Rates of 
Central 
VAT 
(6) 
Subnational 
Share 
Of 
Central  
VAT 
(7) 
Regional 
VATs 
(standard 
rate)  
Argentina 40.3 6.6 21    
Australia 21.4 43.3 10  100  
Austria 8.3 45.2 20 19
b 
26.8
e 
  
Belgium 10.7 42.6 21  56.8
f 
 
Brazil
a 187.8 6.9 20  10.0
g 
17-19
 
Canada 33.4 43.5 5   7-9.975 
Ethiopia 79.2 0.2 15    
Germany 82.2 40.4 19  47.9
h 
 
India 1,138.8 1.0 12   12.5 
Malaysia 27.7 6.9 None    
Mexico 106.7 8.5 16 11
c 
  
Nigeria 148.1 1.2 5    
Pakistan 164.5 0.9 16    
Russia 141.9 9.1 18    
South 
Africa 
47.8 5.9 14    
Spain 46.1 32.1 18 0.5 to 13
d 
35.7
i 
 
Switzerland 7.6 58.1 8    
UAE 4.3 42.9 None    
USA 305.3 45.8 None    
Venezuela 28.0 8.6 12    
Sources: Columns (2), (3), and (6) are taken from Bird (2010) and in most cases reflect 2007-2008 data. The VAT 
rates in columns (4), (5) and (7) come from the OECD (2010) and a variety of other sources such as the webpages of 
Deloitte, KPMG, World Bank, IMF, and various countries as consulted in May 2012).  
Notes: (a) In Brazil, tax rates are calculated on a tax-inclusive basis so that a rate of 20 percent is equivalent to 25 
percent on the tax-exclusive basis used in most countries. (For details on current VAT rates in Brazil, see Arroyo, 
Jimenez and Mussi 2012).  (b) This rate applies only in two small border regions.  (c) This rate applies (except for 
sales of real estate) in designated areas (not whole states) adjacent to the US border and Belize.  (d) These rates 
apply in the Canary Islands and two small territories in Africa (Ceuta and Melilla).  (e) 11.6 percent to 
municipalities and 15.2 percent to states.  (f) Belgium does not share VAT revenues with regions but with its 
linguistic communities (which in some instances are coterminous with regions).  (g) To compensate states for the 
loss of their VAT (ICMS) revenues through zero-rating exports, 10 percent of the revenues of the central VAT (the 
IPI) are shared with the states in proportion to their share of industrial exports; in turn, as with ICMS revenues in 
general, 25 percent of this transfer is shared by the states with their municipalities.  
(h) 2.1 percent to municipalities and 45.8 percent to states.  (i) 35 percent goes to the states (autonomous 
communities) and an additional 1.0583 percent of the remaining central VAT to municipalities.   
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Rate Differentiation 
 
Three VAT federations impose territorially differentiated rates of the central VAT, with by 
far the most important case being Mexico.  The special rate in Mexico, which applies to sales 
(with a few exceptions such as real estate) within 20 kilometers of the US border, was 
initially introduced when the VAT was adopted in 1980 in order to discourage cross-border 
shopping, given the much lower retail sales tax rates applied in adjacent US states.
8
  When 
Mexico increased its VAT from 15 percent to 16 percent in 2010, the border rate was 
similarly raised from 10 to 11 percent.   
 
Both the perceived benefits and the costs of the border rate have shifted over time, with the 
benefits being lowered by the substantially increased costs of crossing into the United States 
since 2001 and the costs increased as trading patterns within Mexico have been distorted to 
take advantage of the geographic discontinuity in the VAT rate (Davis 2011).   In any case, 
most analysts agree that Mexico should apply a unified rate (e.g. Giugale, Lafourcade and 
Nguyen 2001), and proposals have been made recently to abolish this preferential rate.   
 
Another unusual feature of Mexico’s VAT is that, under agreements with the federal 
government, states play an active role in its administration.  States may not only audit and 
verify compliance with VAT but they are also entitled to keep a significant share of any 
additional revenues secured through such activities.  The rationale underlying this system is 
that local knowledge – derived, for example, from experience with the former state turnover 
taxes - should help enforcement and the prospect of revenue gain should encourage state 
enforcement efforts.  However, such potential advantages may perhaps be outweighed by the 
adverse effects arising from the geographic variation in effective taxation owing to 
differential efforts in different states as well as reduced incentive for more effective federal 
enforcement.
9
 
 
Sharing VAT Revenues 
 
Of the 17 VAT countries shown in Table 1, only five explicitly share VAT revenues with 
subnational governments, with the extreme case being Australia, where all the proceeds of 
the central VAT are transferred to state governments.  Interestingly, the two federal OECD 
countries that are most fiscally decentralized -- Canada and Switzerland -- are the only two in 
which there is no explicit "regional" element in the federal VAT in terms of either rates or the 
designated use of the revenue it yields.  In Switzerland, the VAT is a uniform federal tax and 
all revenue goes to the federal government. The same is true of Canada’s federal VAT (the 
GST, or Goods and Services Tax).  In addition, however, Canada is the only OECD country 
in which subnational governments have the choice of whether or not to impose their own 
VATs, as discussed further below.   
                                                 
8
 The area was subsequently expanded slightly (e.g. to include a municipality bordering Belize in the south). 
9
 This question appears to deserve closer attention than it has received (though see the interesting analysis of 
differential enforcement effects in Germany by Baretti, Huber, and Lichtblau 2001).  For example, one rationale 
mentioned for the current ‘pilot’ merging of the local business tax and the national VAT in Shanghai and some other 
areas in China (see Section 4 below) appears to be to encourage more local enforcement effort. 
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Five federal OECD countries with central VATs earmark explicit shares of VAT revenues to 
sub-central governments, as shown in column 6 of Table 1. Germany has a ‘shared’ federal-
state VAT, that is, a federal tax with a share of the revenue being earmarked for the states 
(länder). Almost half of VAT revenues are distributed to the states (largely on the basis of 
population, although there is also an ‘equalization’ factor because revenue capacity is also 
taken into account) in addition to a small percentage to municipalities. In Austria’s similar 
system, about one quarter of VAT proceeds are distributed to the states and municipalities.  
Over a third of the VAT in Spain goes to the regional governments (and a small additional 
share to local governments). The extreme case of VAT revenue sharing, however, is 
Australia in which all the revenues from the federal VAT are distributed to the states.
10
  
Finally, in Belgium’s peculiar federal structure (Bayenet and de Bruycker 2006), a share of 
the VAT is transferred not to the regions but to the "communities" (linguistically based units) 
in proportions determined initially by the number of school-age children, with the proceeds 
being used to finance education.  The extent to which and the manner in which federal 
countries tax sales at more than one jurisdictional level is not static. In 2001, for example, the 
share of the VAT in the Russian Federation going to the regions was changed from 25 
percent to zero (Martinez-Vazquez, Rider and Wallace 2008). 
 
In addition to such specific VAT sharing, some countries share VAT revenues like other 
central taxes with subnational governments either through some form of general revenue 
sharing (as in Argentina, for example) or through general unconditional grants to subnational 
governments financed by federal revenues, and often allocated in accordance with some kind 
of equalization formula.
11
 With such transfer systems, the revenue that regions receive is not 
directly related either to the amount of revenue directly collected by the central government 
from VAT registrants in that region – the so-called ‘derivation’ basis found in China and 
some other countries– or the (assumed) final impact of the VAT on consumers – the so-
called ‘destination’ basis.  An important exception is Spain, where the VAT share is 
distributed in accordance with territorial consumption, as estimated by the National 
Statistical Institute, thus approximating the destination basis (Sanchez-Maldonado and 
Gomez-Sala 2007).
12
  
 
Summing up, perhaps the main conclusion suggested by Table 1 is simply that countries have 
considerable discretion when it comes to VATs: they can decide what, if any, geographical 
                                                 
10
 In Australia, unlike any of the other countries mentioned, both levels of government, federal and state, must 
unanimously agree to any changes in VAT rate.  Interestingly, a similar, though much weaker, commitment to 
coordinated rate changes played a role in the initial adoption of the HST (Harmonized Sales Tax) in some Canadian 
provinces (Bird 2012). 
11
 For further discussion of equalization transfers, see Ahmad (1997), Bird and Smart (2002), and Martinez-Vazquez 
and Searle (2007).   
12
 A somewhat similar system is used in Canada for the HST, as discussed below, as well as in the United Kingdom, 
which allocates revenues to the Isle of Man under a formula which until July 2011 increased in accordance with the 
growth of the island’s GDP, on the implicit assumption that the structure of that GDP was similar to that of the UK 
as a whole.  However, when it became apparent that much of the recorded island GDP growth in recent years was in 
tax-exempt sectors (finance), the formula was revised so that the subsidy – substantially reduced – is now increased 
according to the growth of different sectors.  
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variation exists in the rates of the central VAT,
13
 how any regional VATs are structured, 
what (if any) revenue from the central VAT flows to regional and/or local jurisdictions, and 
what degree of control such jurisdictions have over the amount of revenue they receive from 
this source.  In only three large federal countries, however – Brazil, India, and Canada - do 
regional governments at present have VATs that are really independent of the central VAT in 
some way.   
 
 
Regional VATs 
  
Table 2 summarizes some of the key characteristics of the regional VATs in these three 
countries.  Although the degree of independence of regional governments is in some respects 
greater in Brazil and India, as discussed below the somewhat more restrictive Canadian 
approach appears to work best administratively as well as in terms of reducing economic 
distortions while simultaneously promoting fiscal autonomy and accountability. 
 
 
Brazil: The Perils of Pioneering? 
 
Few seem to realize the extent to which Brazil has been a pioneer in the VAT world.  Not 
only was Brazil among the earliest adopters of any form of VAT in 1967 --- preceded only 
by France (1954) and Côte d’Ivoire (1960) -- but it was also the first country to adopt a more 
or less comprehensive VAT; the member states of the European Economic Community did 
so only in 1968.  In addition, Brazil was also the first (and for a long time, the only) country 
to introduce VAT at the regional as well as central level.
14
  Brazil has thus had a two-level 
VAT for almost half a century. The federal VAT (the IPI) is limited essentially to the 
manufacturing sector with rates varying by commodity (including some over 100 percent) 
and an average rate of around 20 percent.
15
 The 27 regional (26 states and the federal district) 
VATs (the ICMS) are essentially origin-based, with standard rates of 19 percent in Rio de 
Janeiro, 18 percent in Sao Paulo, Parana, and Minas Gerais, and 17 percent elsewhere, as 
well as a federally-established rate of 12 percent on interstate transactions (7 percent on 
goods sent to less developed regions).
16
  Each state has its own ICMS law with different 
rates, exemptions, and incentives. 
                                                 
13
 Recall, for example, that the ‘border’ rate in Mexico is not delimited by jurisdictional boundaries. Note also that 
even unitary countries like France, Portugal, and Greece can and do establish different VAT rates in different – 
usually small, border, or island – parts of their national territory (Bird 2010). 
14
 For an earlier version of this section, see Bird (2012a).  An interesting appraisal of the initial Brazilian proposals 
in light of the virtually concurrent discussion in Europe is Shoup (1965); the state VATs actually introduced in 1967 
are discussed in detail in Guerard (1973).  
15
 The federal government also imposes two (non-creditable) taxes on the broader VAT base -- CONFINs (a social 
security tax) and PIS, with standard rates of 7.6 percent and 1.65 percent, respectively.  About half the revenue from 
the three main federal taxes, including the IPI, is split more or less equally between the states and municipalities. 
16
 In addition, as discussed further in Section 4 below, municipalities impose a (non-creditable) services tax (ISS), 
usually at a standard rate of 5 percent, on a list of services established by the federal government (excluding services 
subject to ICMS).  Local governments can and do vary both the rates and, by choosing different sets of services, the 
base of this tax. 
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Table 2 
Comparison of Features of Regional VATs
 
 Canada 
QST 
Canada 
HST 
Brazil India 
Comprehensive 
federal VAT with 
similar base 
Yes Yes No No 
Federal VAT proceeds 
shared  with   regions
a 
No No 
 
Limited No 
Sub-national taxes on 
destination basis 
Yes Yes No No  
Sub-national rate 
setting autonomous 
Yes Yes  Yes (except for interstate 
trade) within limits set by 
federal government 
Yes (except Central Sales 
Tax on interstate trade, 
which is supposed to be 
abolished)
c 
Broadly uniform base
b 
Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
Administration Regional Central Regional  Regional 
Strong Administration Yes Yes Varies No 
 NOTES:  
(a) In all three countries, some VAT revenues are shared either through general revenue sharing or general 
unconditional intergovernmental transfers. However, as noted in Table 1, there is no specific VAT sharing with 
subnational governments in these countries, apart from a small transfer in Brazil intended to compensate states for 
the revenue cost of zero-rating exports.  In turn, 25 percent of this transfer, like all ICMS revenues, is redistributed 
to municipalities, in large part in proportion to the value added originating in the municipality.  As Ter-Minassian 
(2012) notes, this procedure both distributes more to localities with large industrial bases and also creates an 
incentive to municipal fragmentation in order to maximize transfers per capita. 
(b)  Only in Canada are both central and regional VATs imposed on largely similar and broadly comprehensive 
bases.  In all three countries, however, the regional VATs have relatively broad and similar bases, although in each 
case there are some exceptions.  In India, different states may exempt different goods, there are differences in the 
extent to which input credits are allowed for capital goods, and the extent to which services are encompassed in the 
tax base is limited. In Brazil, states may grant different exemptions, input credits on capital goods are restricted, and 
most services are subject to a separate municipal tax. In Canada, there are also some (lesser) deviations from 
uniformity under both forms of provincial VAT. 
(c) The CST also applies to sales within state of a few “declared goods” such as aviation turbine fuel. 
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Brazilian taxes are relatively high (35 percent of GDP in 2010), with about 25 percent of 
these taxes imposed and collected by state governments (Ter-Minassian 2012).  Since local 
governments are also unusually large taxers (6 percent of total taxes), Brazil is one of the 
most fiscally decentralized countries in the world.  Both states and municipalities are fiscally 
autonomous in the sense that they can establish the rates of their own taxes. However, as 
Arretche (2007) notes, the federal government not only establishes what states and 
municipalities can tax but it may also specify the conditions under which they can exercise 
their fiscal authority.  If the states disagree, they must muster a majority of members of the 
federal legislature to vote down the legislation (or, depending on the nature of the federal 
law, a substantial minority -- 41 percent -- to defeat a constitutional amendment),  which  
they have found increasingly difficult in recent years (Cheibub, Figuerido and Limongi 2009) 
 
A major reform introduced by the federal government in 1996 moved the state indirect tax 
base closer to a conventional VAT by introducing zero rating for international exports of 
non-manufactured goods as well as an input tax credit for the purchase of capital goods.  
However, many problems remain.
17
 Both domestic and foreign experts have long argued that 
Brazil’s indirect tax system is both inefficient and potentially destabilizing.18  Not only do 
different rates apply to intrastate and interstate transactions but since every state has its own 
VAT law some 40 different rates -- with (tax-exclusive) rates as high as 40 percent on some 
sectors such as telecommunications (Werneck 2008) -- apply to varying degrees in different 
states, as do different rules for crediting.
19
 These differences complicate administration, raise 
compliance costs, and facilitate evasion.   
 
Because Brazilian state VATs are origin-based – taxing exports and exempting imports --
both problems are exacerbated by the freedom with which different states have granted 
exemptions and preferential treatments for different sectors, to the point where this interstate 
competition for mobile investors is usually referred to in Brazil as a "fiscal war."
20
  Since 
each state imposes its VAT on a production (origin) basis while (international) exports are 
zero rated, states that are net international exporters may even end up rebating taxes that were 
paid to other states.  Finally, the base of state VATs is not comprehensive because it excludes 
most services.  For this and other reasons a significant proportion of the burden of the ICMS 
falls on business inputs including capital formation.
21
 Despite such problems, at least some 
                                                 
17
 Indeed, Serra and Afonso (2007) attribute some of the problems of recent years to this reform, particularly the 
abolition of ICMS on exports.  Revenue losses on this account were supposed to be compensated by a federal 
transfer, but over subsequent years constant friction about the amount and allocation of this transfer has exacerbated 
federal-state relations.    
18
 For examples, see Ter-Minassian (1997), Rodden (2003) and Rezende and Afonso (2006). 
19
 State rates are limited for different categories of products by the range of rates – ranging from 0 to 35 percent -  
set by the federal senate (Arroyo, Jimenez and Mussi 2012). However, states are free to establish their own rates for 
particular products, and different categories of goods (e.g. capital goods, food) are taxed at quite different rates in 
different states.  Werneck (2008) reports the range of positive rates was from 1 to 250 percent. Some states with 
international ports even impose lower ICMS rates on imports, thus providing foreign goods a comparative advantage 
over imports from other states (Ter-Minassian 2012). 
20
 Another factor exacerbating interstate competition is that many states still collect the bulk of the ICMS at the 
production stage on the basis of estimated tax liability for an average production chain in particular sectors rather 
than on final retail sales (de Mello 2007). For an interesting analysis of the economic effects of this approach, see de 
Paula and Scheinkman (2010). 
21
 Werneck (2008) estimates that 17 percent of all indirect taxes fall on capital formation. 
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states have substantially strengthened and improved their sales tax administrations in recent 
years (Pinhanez 2008).
22
   
 
Although there have been numerous proposals in recent years intended to reform and 
simplify Brazil’s complex VAT system, as yet none has succeeded, perhaps because most 
have taken the form of federal proposals to increase central power over the VAT.
23
  Since the 
state VATs (the ICMS) need reform, perhaps the best way to do so may be as part of a 
comprehensive reform establishing ‘dual VATs’ at both the federal and state levels, with 
similar bases, some state autonomy in setting rates, and much more coordinated 
administration.  If, as Ter-Minassian (2012) suggests, such a reform were extended to 
encompass most services in the tax base, in effect replacing the present municipal tax on 
services (the ISS), then Brazil would have a system that would closely resemble that now 
found in Canada.
24
    
 
Brazil was a pioneer in sub-central VATs.  A common price paid by ‘first movers’, however, 
is that it sometimes turns out that they may not have adopted the best possible system.  
Brazilian experience suggests that it may be extremely difficult to alter the initial framework, 
no matter how imperfect it is. Still, Brazil’s regional VATs have for over 40 years succeeded 
in providing very substantial ‘own’ revenues to state governments.  States clearly value both 
the revenue and the autonomy so it remains far from clear in which direction Brazil will 
move with respect to reforming indirect taxes or subnational taxation in general, let alone 
when or even if it will do so.    
 
Regional VATs in India: A Work in Progress? 
 
Unlike Brazil, India has always followed the principle of tax separation: that is, in principle 
any one type of tax should be levied by only one level of government.
 
The taxes that may be 
levied by the states are thus clearly separated in the constitution from those that may be 
levied by the federal government (the Union).  Although the constitution provides that final 
(retail) sales on goods can be taxed only by states, for administrative reasons most states 
actually impose sales taxes mainly on prior production stages, thus overlapping much of the 
base of the central taxes on manufactured goods.   With respect to services, however, while 
the constitution assigns a few specific taxes like those on hotels and restaurants to the states 
the center has the residual power to tax other services.  This initial division of taxing powers 
has not made the adoption of a sensible VAT in India easy at either the central or the state 
level.
25
 
 
In practice, the central government has long imposed taxes at various rates on manufactured 
goods, initially as the Union Excise Duty.  The states have similarly imposed taxes at a 
variety of rates on much the same goods (including the central tax in the base). In addition, 
                                                 
22
 However, there is still no coordination between the administration of the federal IPI and the state ICMS with, for 
example, different taxpayer identifications, different returns, and different administrative procedures. 
23
 Arroyo, Jimenez and Mussi (2012) summarize a number of these reform proposals. 
24
 In Brazil’s case, inclusion of services in the tax base would require close attention to the difficult question of how 
to replace this component of local revenues – by ‘sharing’ central and state VAT revenues with municipalities or 
perhaps by introducing some new VAT-like form of local business tax such as those discussed in Section 4 below.  
25
 For an earlier version of this section, see Bird (2012a). 
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for many years interstate trade has been taxed at a uniform rate under the so-called Central 
Sales Tax (CST), with the revenues of this tax being collected and retained by the state of 
origin and the importing state levying its own sales tax in addition -- although it has always 
been relatively easy to avoid CST simply by transferring goods to branches in other states. 
For the most part, however, few services were taxed by either center or states.   
 
In the mid-1980s the central government gradually began to introduce the credit principle of 
VAT to the Union excise duty and to reduce considerably the number of tax rates: the 
resulting tax was called Modified VAT (MODVAT). By 2005, when the name of the tax was 
changed to Central VAT (or CENVAT), a considerable number of services were taxed by the 
central government at a rate of 12 percent and the number of tax rates on goods had been 
essentially reduced to two -- 8 and 16 percent (although a few higher rates applied to specific 
articles).  CENVAT remains far from a full consumption VAT for several reasons.  First, 
credit is given for capital goods purchases only over a two-year period (essentially for 
revenue reasons).  Secondly, taxes imposed on sales of goods beyond the manufacturing 
stage are not creditable at the central level since such taxes are imposed only by the states.  
And, thirdly, the differential central rate structure can result in the accumulation of 
unrefunded input tax credits.   
 
Since further reform to the central VAT to a large extent depends on what happens to state 
sales taxes, for the last decade or so most attention has been paid to reforming those taxes.  
As in Brazil, where state sales tax reform has largely been in the hands of a centrally 
convened council of state finance ministers (CONFAZ), in India state sales tax reform has 
largely been driven by what is called the Empowered Committee (EC) constituted by the 
state finance ministers.  Following an initial stage during which the EC harmonized state 
sales taxes to some extent by introducing floor rates for four commodity groups and freezing 
the sales tax incentives that had become increasingly prevalent in some states, a state level 
VAT was introduced in 2005.
26
  At the last minute, however, some states controlled by 
parties in opposition to the central government dropped out of the agreement.  To break the 
impasse, the central government agreed to compensate states that adopted VAT if they had 
less than 17.5 percent growth in revenue after adopting the tax: compensation would be equal 
to 100 percent of the difference in the first year, 75 percent in the second year and 50 percent 
in the third year.  This offer did the trick, and eventually all states adopted VATs.  Since the 
actual revenue growth turned out to be close to 25 percent, no compensation was required in 
the end.   
 
Perhaps the most encouraging feature of this story is that it demonstrates that even in the 
always turbulent Indian political scene effective inter-state and state-central coordination is 
sometimes possible.  Unsurprisingly, the process of reaching agreement among India's very 
heterogeneous states took considerably longer than originally envisaged.  Nonetheless, in the 
                                                 
26
 Maharastra had pioneered in 1995 by beginning to phase its sales tax into a subtraction-type VAT over time. 
Although the state reverted to its old sales tax in 1999, it continued to provide for partial crediting of input costs 
until it adopted the new ‘standard’ state VAT in 2005.  The Maharastra experiment had many defects, but it did 
show that it was possible for a state, acting on its own, to introduce at least some key VAT features.  (For other, 
quite different, discussions of the feasibility of states acting independently in this way in the US context, see Bird 
(2007) and McLure (2010).)  Haryana was actually the first state in India to introduce the ‘standard’ VAT in 2003, 
with the last state to do so being Uttar Pradesh in 2008 (Das-Gupta 2011).  
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end agreement was reached not only on a common standard rate but also on such critical 
building blocks for the future as a common classification of goods for central and state taxes 
and common taxpayer identification numbers.   
 
The present system is far from perfect (Das-Gupta 2011; Cnossen 2012).  Nonetheless, by 
2012 over 30 states (and union territories) had introduced VATs on a more or less uniform 
basis.  There are two state VAT rates – 4 percent and 12.5 percent, with the latter (standard) 
rate at the retail level being close to the effective level of the federal standard rate (16 percent 
at the manufacturing level).  In effect, state and federal governments in India now divide the 
sales tax base more or less evenly.  The CST tax on interstate trade was reduced from 4 
percent to 3 percent in April 2007 and then to 2 percent in April 2008.  Although this tax was 
supposed to have been abolished by 2010 -- the original target date was 2005 -- it still exists 
and is not part of the VAT system since it is not creditable.  In addition, not only is CENVAT 
included in the base of the state VAT but state VATs and central taxes still cannot be 
credited against each other. Moreover, there are also important problems with the design of 
the state taxes -- for example, most commodities considered to be "inputs" are taxed at 4 
percent while most final goods are taxed at 12.5 percent.  Finally, despite considerable 
discussion of the need for substantial improvements in state sales tax administration and the 
desirability of introducing some sensible system for taxing interstate trade, little appears to 
have been done in either respect.  In practice, most state VATs are still imposed on an origin 
basis and at pre-retail levels (Purohit 2012).  
 
In principle, India would apparently like to move to what would in effect be an integrated 
VAT structure -- called the Goods and Services Tax (GST) -- with central and state taxes 
both covering goods and services, extending to the retail level, and on a fully creditable 
basis.
27
   However, the rates of the two taxes -- the central GST and the state GST -- would 
be independent and there would continue to be no crediting between levels of government. If 
this system were to be put in place, the resulting system would be close to that existing in 
Quebec, Canada (described below), although in the case of Quebec both taxes are operated 
by the provincial government and most Indian commentators appear to favor a common and 
preferably central administration (as with the HST in Canada).  Exemptions and rate 
structures are far more varied among states in India than in Canada, however, and as yet 
India remains some distance from being in a position to integrate either the central and state 
VAT administrations or the different state administrations.   
 
To move further in the direction of an integrated VAT, a constitutional revision to allow the 
states to tax services seems needed. Excluding services from the tax base distorts relative 
prices, reduces the buoyancy of revenues, and probably makes the tax more regressive.  In 
addition, further compensatory revenue underwriting by the central government may be 
necessary: indeed, such an agreement is envisaged with respect to the planned (but much 
delayed) abolition of the CST. Finally, considerable and doubtless lengthy and contentious 
discussions between the central and state governments are needed on rates, especially if both 
                                                 
27
 Despite the important issues about state VATs remaining unresolved in the Indian debate, Indian economists have 
boldly estimated both how much revenue might be produced by such a system and how it would be divided up.  
Unsurprisingly, given the poor data and the need to make numerous assumptions, their estimates do not always 
agree: see, for example, Purohit and Purohit (2010) and Das-Gupta (2011). 
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are to tax essentially the same tax base (Cnossen 2012) – although, as the Canadian case 
discussed below shows, a completely uniform base is not strictly necessary provided 
differences are confined to the retail level.  All in all, while India has moved a considerable 
distance in the direction of establishing regional VATs in recent years it is still, at best, very 
much a work in progress, with much more work needed at both the political and the 
administrative levels before implementing even an imperfect comprehensive VAT either the 
central or the state levels, let alone ‘dual VATs’ that would, as in Canada, work together in a 
more or less integrated way. 
 
Canada: Getting it Right? 
 
In contrast to Brazil and India, Canada, a richer country with a strong tax administration and 
a good central VAT, faced an inherently easier task when it came to introducing sub-central 
VATs.  Still, it took considerable time and effort before Canada’s federal and provincial sales 
tax system evolved to the point at which it can be said that the incremental adoption of a 
mixed ‘dual’ federal-regional VAT system now approximates an ‘integrated’ national sales 
tax (Bird 2012).
 28
   
 
As Table 3 shows, by 2012 five provinces had adopted a VAT in the form of the federally 
administered Harmonized Sales Tax (HST), while one province administers its own VAT, 
three small provinces continue to administer Retail Sales Taxes (RSTs), and one province 
(and three small federal territories) have no sales taxes at all.   Canadian experience thus 
demonstrates that both central and sub-central VATs can work well even in a country in 
which some regions administer their own VATs, some have their own retail sales taxes 
(RSTs), and some have no sales tax at all. 
 
The evolution of the system shown in Table 3 has not been quick or easy, and, as indicated in 
the last column of the table, the system continues to evolve – and not always in the same 
direction. Taxpayer reaction to the introduction of VAT has often been negative at both 
levels of government.  Indeed, two general elections, one federal and one provincial, have 
arguably been fought – and lost – in large part over the question of introducing a VAT.29  
Most recently, following a bitter political fight that pivoted to a considerable extent on the 
issue of the HST, British Columbia’s new government decided in 2011 to replace the HST in 
2013 by an RST similar to that which the HST had replaced in 2010.
30
  Nonetheless, this 
                                                 
28
 The present section draws heavily on this paper as well as Bird and Gendron (2010), and Smart and Bird (2012).  
The good words said here with respect to Canada’s regional VATs do not imply that the basic central VAT – the 
federal GST – is particularly good: for recent critical appraisals of the GST see, for example, Bird (2009), Smart 
(2012), Bass and Gendron (2012), and Gendron (2012). 
29
 The federal Progressive Conservative government that introduced the GST was reduced to just 2 seats in the 
general election of 1993 – although this was of course not the only issue in the campaign.  The province of 
Saskatchewan announced its intention to adopt the HST in 1991, but this decision was reversed by a new 
government that came into power the same year, before implementation occurred. Most recently, the government of 
the province of British Columbia managed to stay in power only by replacing its leader and agreeing to abide by a 
referendum that subsequently led to the decision to revert from the HST to the RST. 
30
 Five countries that had adopted VAT similarly previously abolished it.  Subsequently, however, all five 
reintroduced the tax (Bird and Gendron 2007).  It is too soon to say whether BC will follow this precedent. At the 
time of writing, the province appeared to be considering the extent to which the distortions arising from returning to 
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reversal has been offset to some extent by the decision in 2011 by an additional province (the 
small province of Prince Edward Island) to join the HST system in 2013 as well as by the 
decision by Quebec to move its separate provincial VAT (the QST) much closer to the base 
of the federal GST (as well as to the bases of the HST in the neighbouring provinces of 
Ontario and New Brunswick) in 2013.  
Table 3 
Sales Taxes in Canada, 2012 
Jurisdiction Name of 
Tax 
Type 
of 
Tax 
Rate 
(%) 
Yield as 
Share 
of total 
taxes 
(%) 
Administration Comments 
Canada GST/HST VAT 5 17.3 Federal except in 
Quebec, where it 
is provincial 
GST rate (federal) is 5% and 
applied throughout the country; 
the federal government also 
administers a provincial VAT rate 
of 7-10% in the HST provinces. 
Newfoundland 
and Labrador 
HST VAT 8 25.1 Federal HST revenues collected in the five 
HST provinces are distributed to 
these provinces based on estimated 
taxable consumption. 
Nova Scotia HST VAT 10 44.2 Federal See comment on Newfoundland. 
Nova Scotia has announced that it 
will lower its HST rate to 9% in 
2014 and 8% in 2015. 
New 
Brunswick 
HST VAT 8 15.3 Federal See comment on  Newfoundland 
Prince Edward 
Island 
PST RST 10 27.4 Provincial Applied to retail sales price 
including GST. PEI is to move to 
the HST in 2013 at a rate of 9% 
(excluding GST from the base). 
Quebec  QST 
(TVQ) 
VAT 9.5 16.2 Provincial Applied to GST base plus GST. 
Quebec is to move its tax much 
closer to the HST base in 2013 at a 
rate of 9.975% (excluding GST 
from the base).  However, it will 
continue to administer its own tax 
(as well as the federal GST in 
Quebec) 
Ontario HST VAT 8 22.3 Federal See comment on Newfoundland 
Manitoba PST RST 7 23.1 Provincial Applied to retail sale price 
excluding GST 
Saskatchewan PST RST  5 18.4 Provincial Same as Manitoba 
Alberta  None     Three northern territories (Yukon, 
Northwest Territories, and 
Nunavut) also have no sales tax 
British 
Columbia 
HST VAT 7 16.8 Federal British Columbia intends to revert 
to a provincially-administered 
RST (at same rate) in 2013 
Source: updated from Bird (2012). 
                                                                                                                                                             
the RST might be reduced by permitting increased deductions for business inputs especially those for capital 
expenditures along the lines suggested in McLure (2010).   
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 The initial introduction of the federal GST was complicated by the fact that all provinces but 
one already levied a retail sales tax.  Perhaps desperate to get some province on board the 
GST train, the federal government finally managed to strike a rather curious deal with 
Quebec so that when the GST was introduced at the federal level in 1991 Quebec 
simultaneously replaced its RST by a new provincial VAT, the Quebec Sales Tax (QST). 
Under the federal-Quebec agreement, Quebec was to collect not only the QST but also the 
federal GST and to be compensated by the federal government for the costs it incurred in 
administering the federal tax.
31
  For over twenty years Quebec has thus been the only 
subnational jurisdiction in the world to operate an independently administered destination-
based VAT.  
 
The QST is a destination-based, credit-invoice VAT that subjects most goods and services 
consumed in Quebec to tax at a statutory rate (in 2012, 9.5 percent) applied to the GST-
inclusive price of supplies.
32
  Goods and services produced and consumed in Quebec or 
imported into the province are subject to tax. Transactions conducted in the province are also 
subject, usually at the same time, to the federal GST at the (current) 5 percent rate. Both 
taxes are collected at the point of sale, and their amounts are generally not included in 
advertised prices although they are shown separately on all invoices, including those issued 
to final consumers.
33
  
 
The QST applies to a base that is now substantially harmonized with that of the federal 
GST.
34
 However, the QST continues to differ from the GST by limiting input tax credits to 
large businesses for such items as fuel, transportation and communications equipment, and 
expenditures on meals and entertainment. When Ontario and British Columbia (BC) joined 
the HST system (see below) in 2011, they introduced somewhat similar restrictions. Like 
most deviations from the GST ‘norm’, these variant provisions are administered free of 
charge by the federal government in HST provinces.  However, an explicit part of the 2010 
agreements made by Ontario and BC with the federal government was that these credit 
limitations were to be phased out by 2015.  Quebec has similarly agreed to phase out its 
restrictions on input refunds by 2020. 
 
Other differences exist between the GST and the HSTs in different provinces as well as 
between the QST and the GST.  For example, all provinces tax new housing differently.  The 
federal GST pays a 36 percent rebate (i.e. rate reduction) on new houses sold for prices less 
than $350,000, with the rebate phased out on prices between $350,000 and $450,000.  In 
Quebec and Nova Scotia the reductions are much smaller, while Newfoundland and New 
                                                 
31
 This fee is negotiated annually. 
32
 Beginning in 2013, under a new agreement with the federal government, Quebec has agreed to levy the tax on the 
GST-exclusive price.  To maintain revenue, the tax rate will be increased to 9.975 percent. 
33
 As Bird (2010a) discusses, the separate quotation of both federal and provincial VATs in Canada is unique, with 
the result that the public is always very aware of these taxes and their salience in political debate is much higher than 
with VATs in countries like those in the EU in which advertised prices include VAT.  
34
 Until 2013, the most important base difference was the treatment of financial institutions, which are exempt under 
GST but were zero-rated under QST, so that financial institutions could recover the QST they pay on most of their 
inputs. The rationale for this favorable treatment presumably was to improve the attractiveness of basing the 
headquarters of financial institutions in Quebec, particularly relative to neighbouring Ontario (which, prior to 
adopting the HST in 2010, taxed such inputs as computers). 
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Brunswick went even further and opted for full taxation of housing.  In contrast, Ontario 
offers an enhanced reduction of 75 percent of the provincial tax on the sale price of houses 
up to $400,000.     
 
HST provinces are allowed to deviate from the GST base so long as the affected 
commodities do not exceed 5 percent of the provincial tax base.  For example, all provinces 
zero-rate books, which are taxable under the federal GST.
35
  Such variations are particularly 
important in Ontario, Canada’s largest province, in which children’s clothing, books, 
newspapers, and feminine hygiene products, all of which were previously RST-exempt, are 
accorded “point-of-sale rebates” of the Ontario portion (8 percent) of the 13 percent HST.  
Since these goods bear only the 5 percent federal rate at all stages of the production chain, 
but full ITCs are available to traders, the provincial portion of HST is effectively zero-rated.  
Like the GST, both the HST and QST provide partial input tax rebates to exempt traders in 
the broader public sector at ranging from 50 to 100 percent of input taxes paid.  Again, the 
level of these rebates differs between the federal GST and the different provincial VATs. 
With respect to municipalities, for example, which since 2004 receive a 100 percent rebate 
on the federal GST, Ontario gives a 78 percent rebate, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick 50 
percent, and Newfoundland, like Quebec, gives nothing. 
 
In the initial HST agreements the federal government required a uniform rate in all acceding 
provinces.   However, as Table 3 shows, like the federal government, which reduced its GST 
rate from 7 to 5 percent a few years ago, provinces now have full autonomy in setting their 
HST rates. The original restriction on provincial rate autonomy created a major political 
stumbling block in the federal government’s quest to induce provinces to adopt the tax and 
was one reason why the larger provinces were slow to agree to join the HST system.  
 
In the HST provinces, the provincial VAT is administered together with the federal GST and 
collected by the federal government.  The revenues are then allocated on the basis of 
destination, not origin. The revenue collected in any particular province (or with respect to 
any particular transaction) is not ‘tracked’ but is instead defined as the total GST/HST 
payable in any particular year, with the annual revenue entitlement—the share—that any 
province receives being calculated by a formula that in effect allocates the national GST 
taxable base among all provinces–not just the HST provinces—and then applies the tax rate 
applicable to that province to its calculated share of the base. The approach taken to revenue 
allocation is highly pragmatic.
36
  For example, taxes paid by federal departments and 
agencies (and also by HST provincial departments and agencies) are excluded from the 
revenue pool that is allocated, as are specified refunds and rebates as well as any interest and 
penalties. Nor is any allowance made to account for the facts that some reported GST is not 
paid and that collection efforts may produce further revenue subsequent to the closing date 
for adjustments. The federal government simply keeps any such later gains as well as any 
interest and penalties attributable to GST/HST accounts; on the other hand, it has to “eat” any 
unpaid GST/HST in determining the HST allocations.  
 
                                                 
35
 Newfoundland, Ontario, and British Columbia also offer a low-income credit (like the federal GST credit, on 
which see Bird 2009).  This provision, like the book rebates, is provincially legislated but federally administered. 
36
 For a detailed description, see Bird and Gendron (2010). 
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In contrast, the QST is administered by the provincial government together with the federal 
GST in Quebec.  Revenu Québec (RQ) registers GST payers in the province, as well as 
registering a slightly larger population of QST registrants.
37
  The emergence, and acceptance, 
of this ‘dual’ system reflects a number of specific conditions.  Provincial administration was 
presented by the Quebec government as a necessary condition for harmonizing with its tax 
with the GST, reflecting the determination of the (separatist) governing party that the 
provincial government should be “the face of government” to the people of the province. 
Despite its recent agreement to harmonize its VAT base much more closely to the federal 
GST base, Quebec has continued to administer both the federal and provincial sales taxes in 
the province and to retain its separate QST rather than becoming a ‘participating province’ in 
the HST system.  
 
The HST provinces not only have their sales taxes administered for free by the Canada 
Revenue Agency (CRA); they also received one-time “transition payments” from the federal 
government for having adopted a VAT. The three Atlantic provinces that initially agreed to 
adopt HST in 1997 received one-time payments totalling slightly less than C$1 billion.  Since 
these provinces agreed to substantial reductions in their sales tax rates as part of the HST 
agreement,
 
these payments were structured as compensation for the forecast loss in provincial 
tax revenues resulting from the reform.
 38
  Subsequent transition payments made to acceding 
provinces, although smaller in per capita terms, were larger in total:  Ontario received $4.3 
billion and BC $1.6 billion for accession in 2010.
39
  When Quebec agreed recently to 
harmonize its VAT base more completely, it also received what was in effect a retroactive 
payment of $2.2 billion for its decision to adopt a provincial VAT in 1991.  The recent 
transition payments were based on estimated provincial consumption rather than the 
estimated changes in provincial revenues.
40
   
 
Given the rate differences now applying among provinces, an important technical issue with 
provincial VATs might seem to be how to determine the “place of supply” (where tax 
liability accrues). Until recently, the primary criterion used at the provincial level with 
respect to the place of supply of services was the “place of performance” of a service so that 
in practice the tax on interprovincial services was generally applied on an origin rather than 
destination basis. This definition was adopted because of difficulties in defining a unique 
location for the supplier (or recipient) when either may have establishments located in more 
than one province that are engaged on one side or the other of particular services.  This rule 
also ensures that no adverse consequences arise from collecting the HST on services 
rendered to businesses in other provinces. Since credits generated by such HST may be offset 
against GST, however, the HST has always been an integrated national tax rather than simply 
a “provincial” tax.  
 
                                                 
37
 In 2007-08, for example, 616,052 entities were registered for QST compared to the 588,489 entities registered for 
GST in Quebec. 
38
 The RST rate in Newfoundland was 12 percent and it was 11 percent in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick at the 
time these provinces introduced the 8 percent HST.   
39
 The province is required to repay this amount as a result of its move back to the RST in 2013. 
40
 Under the original formula, since Quebec, Ontario, and BC did not have a decrease of more than 5 percent in their 
revenues as a result of the tax substitution, they would not have been eligible for compensation.   
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In 2010, the place of supply rules were changed to treat goods and services more 
symmetrically by shifting the place of supply with respect to services to a considerable extent 
from an origin to a destination basis, although it appears many details still remain to be 
worked out with respect to exactly how these rules will be applied in practice (Ruffalo 2011).  
This issue does not affect how revenues are allocated among HST provinces but it may of 
course increase VAT compliance and enforcement costs. 
 
Under the QST, exports (whether to another province or outside Canada) are zero-rated. 
Imports are in principle subject to tax.  For imports from abroad the QST is collected (with 
the GST) at the border by the Canadian Border Security Agency (CBSA) under an agreement 
with the federal government.
41
  However, imports by registrants for business purposes from 
other provinces are not subject to tax if an input tax credit could be claimed.  The treatment 
of interprovincial imports under the QST is thus similar to the ‘deferred payment’ system in 
the EU.
 42
 Finally, goods imported from elsewhere in Canada by Quebec residents who are 
not registrants are subject to QST on a self-assessment basis – a provision that seems 
unlikely to be any more effective than the similar ‘use tax’ provisions commonly found in 
retail sales taxes. Nonetheless, fraudulent interprovincial transactions are not seen as a big 
problem in Canada, in part perhaps because, as Bird and Gendron (1998) noted, the existence 
of the overriding federal GST provides an audit control on the reporting of interprovincial 
supplies for purposes of provincial HST (and QST). 
 
Summing up, Canada has developed two quite different models of regional VAT.  First, the 
QST and the federal VAT (GST) constitute an operational “dual VAT” system, arguably with 
few or none of the problems usually thought to be associated with such systems.
43
  The rates 
of the two taxes are set independently by the respective governments.  The tax bases are also 
determined independently, although they are close to uniform.  From the beginning, both 
taxes have been collected by a single administration -- that of the province.  Taxes on 
interprovincial sales from one business to another are basically handled by a zero-rating 
(deferred-payment) system similar to that now applied in the EU.   Problems in enforcing the 
QST on interprovincial imports are largely obviated by the existence, and enforcement, of the 
federal GST (Bird and Gendron 1998).    
 
The second model of the HST is similar in many respects.  Again, provinces have both rate 
autonomy and, within limits, base autonomy, and the taxes are applied by a single 
administration – in this case the federal government – which essentially eliminates 
interprovincial enforcement problems and closely mimics how a regional destination-based 
VAT (like the QST) operates.   Moreover, because HST revenues are distributed to the 
provinces on the basis of estimated taxable consumption times the provincial rate (with both 
the rate and, within limits, the base being established by provincial law) provincial tax 
autonomy remains strong.    
                                                 
41
 Similar agreements exist with most provinces, even those with RSTs. 
42
 From the perspective of the QST it does not matter if the province in question has no sales tax, an RST or is a 
member of the HST system: the shipment is zero-rated.  However, if a GST registrant in any province, including 
Quebec, ships to a customer in an HST province, the tax rate applied is of course the HST rate, not the GST rate.  
For a strong defense of the supposedly ‘transitional’ EU system, see Cnossen (2010). 
43
 See, for example, the discussions of alternative, more complex ways of dealing with such problems suggested by 
Varsano (2000), McLure (2000), and Keen and Smith (1996, 2000) as discussed briefly in Section 3 below.   
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Canada thus demonstrates that with good tax administration it is perfectly feasible to operate 
a VAT at the subnational level on a destination basis.  In principle, it is immaterial whether 
there are two separate administrations or one; or, if there is one, which level operates it.  
Clearly, a single central administration and a common base (as with the HST) is likely to be 
more administratively and economically efficient, but these results may be approximated 
more or less satisfactorily when there is, as in Canada, a high degree of intergovernmental 
cooperation e.g. through unified and joint audit, an (almost) uniform VAT registration 
system and good information exchange.   Most importantly, as the second-generation fiscal 
federalism literature (Weingast 2009; Oates 2008) emphasizes is critical from the perspective 
of improving accountability, each taxing government is able independently to determine its 
own VAT rate.  VAT is not perfect, but no tax is, and it is clearly better than RST for 
regional as well as central governments from an economic – if not so clearly a political – 
perspective (Smart and Bird 2012).   
 
 
3. VAT in a Common Market 
 
A country is a common market.  Canada’s experience suggests that regional destination-
based VATs should be able to work satisfactorily in a common market without either internal 
border controls or border adjustments.  The principal reason VAT was originally adopted as 
the required form of general sales taxation in the European Common Market (now the EU) 
was its advantage in implementing the destination principle with respect to cross-border 
trade.  Only with this form of sales tax could member countries be sure that imports were 
treated fairly in comparison to domestic products and exports were not subsidized by over-
generous rebates at the border.  Ironically, how best to apply VAT to cross-border trade 
within the EU has still not been fully resolved.  Since the Neumark Report (1963), which 
recommended the eventual adoption of the origin principle for intra-EU trade, numerous 
studies and reports have suggested solutions to the perceived problems with the present EU 
VAT system.   
 
Implementing the Destination Principle 
 
For example, others since Neumark (1963) have favored the origin principle – indeed, as 
noted above, Brazil has had origin-based VATs for almost 50 years.  However, the case for 
doing so does not seem persuasive.
44
  The conditions of wage and exchange rate flexibility 
needed to avoid substantial distortions in production efficiency when different jurisdictions 
levy different rates under the origin principle seem most unlikely to be adequately met within 
most large countries, let alone in the EU or even the Euro-zone.  The destination principle is 
both more compatible with independent taxation of consumption and, in practice, less likely 
to result in important economic distortions (Keen and Smith 1996). 
                                                 
44
 For a useful outline of the various ways in which "destination" and "origin" have been defined over the years in GATT 
and EU discussions of sales and excise taxes, see Messere (1994).  On the long-standing theoretical debate about the 
relevant merits of origin and destination principles and the effects of switching from one to the other: see, for example, 
Lockwood (1993); Lockwood, de Meza, and Myles (1994, 1995); Bovenberg (1994); Lopez-Garcia (1996); and Genser 
(1996).  
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Deferred Payment 
 
The destination principle is applied in the EU – as in Quebec, Canada - using what is called 
the ‘deferred-payment’ method (Cnossen and Shoup 1987).  Exports by firms in one member 
country to registered traders in other member countries are zero-rated by the selling country 
without requiring border clearance.  Such sales are thus treated just like sales to non-EU 
countries.  In contrast to imports from non-EU countries, however, imports by registered 
traders from firms in other EU member countries are not taxed at the border.  Instead, 
importers in effect pay the VAT on imports (at their own country's rates) on their own final 
sales because they have no input tax credits to offset against the tax due.  This system works 
on a self-assessment basis.  Importers are supposed to declare their imports from other EU 
countries, compute the VAT that would be due (at their own country’s rates), and claim 
credit for that VAT, all in one return.  The net result is that VAT is collected on imports by 
registered businesses only when they are resold or incorporated into goods sold by the 
importing firm.  As an aid to enforcement, exporters zero-rating sales to other EU member 
states are required to quote the VAT registration number of the buyer (Keen and Smith 
1996). 
 
The deferred-payment system gives rise to problems and improper claims for credits or 
refunds when tax rates differ in member states.  Some special rules have long been in place 
within the EU to cope with such problems.  For example, vehicles are subject to tax in the 
country in which they are registered, and firms that would otherwise be exempt from VAT 
are subject to VAT on the destination basis once their imports exceed a specified threshold 
(Keen and Smith 1996).  Similar provisions apply with respect to provincial VATs in 
Canada.  However, no one has yet found any simple and uniform way to deal with all cross-
border shopping problems under any destination-based sales tax.  In practice, such special 
provisions appear to have kept serious problems in check so far in both the EU and Canada, 
although the rules are being increasingly tested with respect to ‘digital’ cross-border sales.45  
Nonetheless, EU countries have been so concerned in recent years about fraudulent credit 
claims with respect to cross-border sales that, as discussed below, numerous schemes have 
been proposed and to some extent adopted in order to check such VAT evasion. 
 
Clearing House 
 
This system for zero-rating intra-EU trade may be contrasted with the ‘clearing-house’ 
method under which VAT would be charged on exports by the exporting state, with a credit 
allowed for this VAT by the importing state (as for any other input VAT, but at the tax rate 
imposed by the exporting state).
46
  Revenue accounts would then be balanced between states 
either on a transaction basis or in accordance with consumption statistics.  In practice, the 
deferred payment system—which in effect puts reliance on private sector accounting subject 
to VAT audits— appears likely to work as well as or better than the explicit interstate settling 
of accounts required in the transaction version of the clearing-house approach. 
 
 
                                                 
45
 The issues of taxing digital services is discussed further in e.g. Bird (2005) and Bird and Gendron (2007). 
46
 This is essentially how the ‘common’ system proposed in Commission (1996) would work. 
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Dealing with Evasion 
 
There are many ways to cheat on any sales tax.  In principle—and with good administration 
in practice also—it is actually more difficult to cheat with a VAT than with other forms of 
(non-cascading) sales taxes (Bird and Gendron 2007).  To the extent VAT fraud takes the 
form of obtaining illicit refunds it may perhaps show up more explicitly in the budget than 
equivalent fraud with other forms of sales tax simply because it takes the form of explicit 
refunds rather than lower revenues, but the net impact on the budget is the same in the end.  
Dealing with VAT refund fraud is no different than dealing with any other form of tax 
evasion.  The correct treatment for VAT refunds is simply to pay legitimate claims promptly 
and not to pay fraudulent claims at all. The problem, of course, is how to distinguish the good 
from the bad.  The answer is to be found not so much in special treatment of refund claims as 
in better administration of all aspects of the VAT system. 
 
It is critical to ensure that refunds are justified not only by being related to legitimate 
business inputs but also in the sense that the taxes for which reimbursement is being claimed 
have actually been paid.  However, even countries with well-established and experienced tax 
administrations like Germany and the UK have struggled to verify cross-border claims, for 
example, when a bogus firm supposedly located in another EU country in the value-added 
chain claims credits for inputs it does not actually buy and then disappears before it can be 
audited.   
 
Various schemes have been proposed to deal with such fraud.  For example, Sinn, Gebauer, 
and Parsche (2004) proposed that banks would remit the tax directly to the government at the 
time of sale through the device of an intermediate ‘trust’ account, while issuing a receipt to 
the seller for VAT paid, with this receipt serving as proof of the input tax claim.   Other ways 
of limiting fraud that have been adopted in various countries range from making refunds to 
new registrants only after a mandatory six-month carry-forward of unused credits or limiting 
refunds only to firms in certain industries (as in China) or of a certain size (as is done in 
Québec with respect to credits for capital goods).
47
   
 
Most commonly, perhaps, countries both in the EU and elsewhere have adopted to varying 
degrees what is called ‘reverse charging’, which places the liability on the buyer rather than 
on the seller in transactions between registrants (Mirrlees 2011).  This system works in the 
sense that it reduces the likelihood of fraud by eliminating the chance to claim refunds of tax 
that has not been paid.  At the same time, however, this approach is fundamentally 
contradictory to the very rationale of the VAT as a fractional consumption tax: indeed, at the 
extreme by turning the crediting system into a suspension system it turns a VAT into a retail 
sales tax – a tax that is itself of course subject to all sorts of fraudulent practices, practices 
that the VAT form of sales tax was introduced in part to counter.
 48
   
 
                                                 
47
 Harrison and Krelove (2005) provide a useful discussion of such methods. 
48
Analytically, if the base of a retail sales tax is not only exactly equivalent to the base of a well-designed value-
added tax but the two are also equally politically acceptable and can be equally well administered, there may be no 
particular reason to choose the VAT; in reality, however, as Bird and Gendron (2007) emphasize, the conditions 
required for the two taxes to produce similar outcomes seem most unlikely to be met. 
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Solving a VAT administrative problem by throwing out the VAT seems like overkill. In the 
end, the only real solution to VAT fraud in any country is, as Cnossen (2010) suggests, a 
stronger tax administration and in particular a strong audit program, reinforced by improved 
international information exchange and cooperation.   
 
Why Canada’s Regional VATs Work 
 
How have Canada’s regional VATs apparently managed to avoid the problems causing such 
concern in the EU?  One explanation is simply that the two situations are completely 
different.  From some perspectives, for example, the HST might be considered as simply a 
national tax, the revenues of which are shared according to formula among the federal and 
participating provincial governments.  Although, as Bird and Gendron (2010) argue in detail, 
the effect is to allocate revenues on a destination basis and the amount of revenues received 
is ultimately determined by policy decisions on rates and base made by the recipient 
provinces, this approach is nonetheless quite distinct from the derivation basis for taxation 
that applies in the EU, where the place of supply rules (in particular, zero-rating of intra-EU 
exports) have a direct impact on the revenues of national governments – a problem that has, 
of course, also long been of concern in Brazil even with its basically origin-based state VATs 
(Longo 1990).  In Canada, however, even in the case of Quebec -- in which, as in the EU, the 
VAT is administered directly by the province (member state), whose efforts (and laws) thus 
directly determine the revenues received -- with minor exceptions (Ainsworth 2007), there is 
not the same level of concern about problems such as ‘carousel’ and ‘missing trader’ frauds 
found even in countries like the UK with generally well-run VATs (HMRC 2012). 
 
The more important difference from the EU is simply that Canada has a real central 
government.  Although the EU redistributes substantial funds through its various transfers 
and support programs, it does not, like Canada, operate an explicit fiscal equalization 
program under which most provincial governments receive substantial transfers.  The 
existence of an equalization system makes the HST revenue allocation formula less important 
than it would otherwise be.  Under equalization, provinces with below-average fiscal 
capacity are paid annual federal grants that fill in the gap between their own fiscal capacities 
and the national average capacity, calculated at average provincial tax rates.  Essentially all 
provincial own-source revenues, including consumption taxes, are included in the formula.  
Although the calculation of consumption tax capacities under equalization is different than 
the calculation of revenue shares under the HST, the formulas are not that dissimilar, with the 
result that the two transfers are largely offsetting.  For example, an increase in a province’s 
estimated share of national (taxable) consumption would result in an increase in the revenues 
allocated to it under the HST allocation formula; at the same time, however, the increase in 
its measured fiscal capacity for consumption taxes under the equalization formula would 
result in a decrease in its equalization grant that would more or less offset the additional HST 
revenues (Smart and Bird 2012).  
 
The provinces agreeing to harmonize their sales taxes have for the most part been 
equalization-receiving provinces.  Quebec and the three original HST provinces in Atlantic 
Canada are all provinces of below-average per capita income which have received 
equalization grants in each year since the program’s inception in 1957.  Ontario negotiated its 
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accession to HST in 2009, the year after it qualified for equalization grants for the first time 
in history.  British Columbia is the only HST province not to receive equalization; it is also 
the only province to have pulled out of the HST after implementing it. On the other hand, this 
is not the whole story since, although Quebec receives equalization grants, it does not benefit 
from the HST formula.  However, like all equalization-receiving provinces Quebec has an 
incentive to impose tax rates that are higher than they would otherwise be (Smart 1998) 
because, in addition to increasing sales tax collections (directly for Quebec; indirectly for the 
HST provinces), a higher tax rate raises the national average rate and hence the size of the 
equalization pool.  This effect is especially important for the larger provinces such as Ontario 
and Quebec where changes in provincial rates have the greatest impact on the (weighted) 
national average rate. 
 
These factors are certainly not unimportant.  Still, they do not really explain why destination-
base sub-central VATs seem to operate so well as in the Canadian ‘common market’ on a 
deferred payment basis without the problems currently associated with the member state 
VATs that operate on the same basis in the EU.  Unlike Canada, the EU began with a more 
or less common VAT tax base, which applies in all member states.  Over time, as discussed 
earlier, Canada has managed to establish a similarly more or less common VAT base in some 
of its component units – but not all.  Perhaps the most important reason why the system 
works in Canada is because Canada, unlike the EU, has an over-riding central VAT that 
operates in the same way in every province so that the federal tax in effect underpins the 
provincial tax even when, as in Quebec, both are administered by the province.  On balance, 
what Canada’s experience suggests is that although while a uniform law and a single central 
administration would in all likelihood be more effective and efficient, the most necessary 
condition for successful sub-central VATs in a common market is neither the complete 
convergence of laws or central administration but simply good tax administration (at 
whichever level) as well as a high degree of intergovernmental cooperation e.g. through 
unified audit or at least through a uniform VAT registration system and a very high level of 
information exchange – in other words, more or less the package of administrative reforms 
that Cnossen (2010) has suggested for the EU.     
 
Alternative Approaches to Two-Level VATs 
 
Both variants of Canada’s dual VAT system seem to work better than the EU’s attempt to (in 
effect) administer VATs at what in the EU context is the equivalent of the regional (sub-
central) level.
49
  Other approaches dealing with this problem have of course also been 
suggested in the literature, as illustrated in Table 4, which compares some features of five 
possible approaches to state VATs in ‘two-level’ jurisdictions:  
 Two levels of governments have completely independent taxes. This is the EU (and 
US) case, in which the central authority has no VAT.  Brazil also comes close to this 
situation, although its states do not have complete rate autonomy.   
 Each level of government may have an independent VAT—‘dual’ VATs— in which 
each level sets its rates independently but on similar bases and there is a high level of 
administrative cooperation.  This is Canada’s GST-QST system.   
                                                 
49
 For an earlier discussion of some of the points in this section, see Bird and Gendron (2000). 
 Below the Salt: Decentralizing Value-Added Taxes 25 
 There is a single ‘joint’ VAT—essentially a central VAT with some of the revenue 
flowing to the states either in accordance with jointly agreed but estimated 
consumption bases and independently determined rates, as in Canada’s HST system, 
or with a centrally determined rate and a centrally determined consumption formula 
(as in Spain), distributive formula (as in Germany) or derivation formula (as in 
China).   
 A theoretical system not yet been applied anywhere (although initially proposed for 
Brazil by Varsano 1995, 2000) is what McLure (2000) calls a ‘compensating VAT’ 
(CVAT), under which in effect the central government applies a zero-rate tax to 
interstate transactions.  
 Another theoretical system is the VIVAT (“viable integrated VAT”) proposal put 
forth for the EU by Keen and Smith (1996) and developed further in Keen (2000), 
and Keen and Smith (2000), under which all member states of the EU would apply 
the same VAT rate to B2B (business-to-business) transactions, including cross-border 
transactions within the common market, while being free to apply higher rates to sales 
to domestic final consumers.   
 
How one assesses these different approaches to decentralizing VAT hinges largely on 
the relative weight attached to characteristics such as those listed in Table 4.  While 
the entries in the cells in this table are of course largely subjective, several general 
comments may be made.  First, the best basis for a decentralized VAT system is a 
well-designed and comprehensive central VAT.  Such a system works best when 
there is an adequate degree of (justified) mutual trust by sub-central and central 
governments in each other’s competence.  Although a single central administration 
and a common base would be ideal, Canadian experience shows that this degree of 
convergence appears to be neither essential nor necessarily desirable.  What is critical 
is either a system of joint or unified audits or at least a high level of information 
exchange to make the system work well, combined with each taxing government 
independently determining its own VAT rate in order to create the right incentives.  
That the system works between two such strong political opponents as the 
government of Canada and the government of Québec suggests that the required level 
of trust—or, perhaps more appropriately, respect—may not be all that high.50  
Nonetheless, it may be asking too much to expect an equivalent relationship (or 
quality of administration) soon either in the EU (at the union level) or in countries 
like Brazil and India. 
                                                 
50
 Bird and Vaillancourt (2006) discuss how fiscal relations between Quebec and Canada have evolved over time. 
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Table 4 
Some Characteristics of Alternative Two-Level VAT Systems 
 
 Separate VATs Dual VATs Joint VAT CVAT VIVAT 
Rate autonomy Yes Yes Possible Some Some 
Collection incentives Strong Strong Good Unknown Unknown 
Compliance 
symmetry 
No No Yes No Yes 
Need to identify 
destination state 
Yes No No No Yes 
Administrative cost High Depends on 
system 
Low Moderate Higher? 
Need to distinguish 
types of  purchasers 
(other than exempt) 
No No No Yes Yes 
Credit tracking Yes No No No Yes 
Excess credits Some Few No Some Yes 
Administrative 
capacity 
High Less Lower Moderate High 
Central 
administration 
No Some needed Probable but 
not necessary 
Probably Probably 
Need for single 
administration 
No Preferable Yes No No 
Need for central state 
cooperation 
No Yes Yes Yes High 
Revenue distribution Independent Independent Formula Essentially 
independent 
Yes 
Need for clearing of 
some credits 
No No No Yes Yes 
Potential for 
interstate evasion 
High Restricted No Restricted Restricted 
Cross-border 
shopping a problem 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
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VIVAT 
 
As Keen (2000) emphasizes, the VIVAT is explicitly designed for a situation like the EU in 
which there is no central VAT. However, if much importance is attached to state rate 
autonomy and administrative feasibility, of the five possibilities shown in Table 4 only the 
second (dual VAT) and fourth (CVAT) seem worth further consideration.  How taxes are 
perceived to be levied and by whom may play a critical role in establishing the needed 
“Wicksellian connection” (Breton 1996) between revenues and expenditures at each level 
needed for good fiscal management in a multi-tiered government structure, and this link is 
more transparent with the dual VAT system.  As McLure (2000) notes, permitting state 
governments to set their own tax rates is critical to providing an appropriate incentive 
structure for efficient and effective sub-central government in large federal states, and the 
CVAT proposal is definitely superior to the VIVAT alternative from this perspective.  The 
one aspect in which the VIVAT proposal is clearly superior to both CVAT and the dual VAT 
is what is called “compliance symmetry,” or the application of the same tax rate to all sales to 
registered traders within the EU.  While the VIVAT approach has recently been revived to 
some extent by Mirrlees (2011) as preferable to other ‘patchwork’ approaches to dealing with 
export-related fraud – such as those mentioned briefly below - it appears to require at least as 
much agreement among all member states as the dual VAT or CVAT while reducing state 
fiscal autonomy more.  
 
CVAT 
In developing countries with little realistic prospect of good tax administration at the sub-
central level, a potentially promising approach may be to impose what is in effect a 
supplemental central VAT—the compensating VAT or CVAT.  This proposal reduces the 
risk that households (and unregistered traders) in any state can dodge that state’s VAT by 
pretending to be registered traders located in other states.
51
 Assuming that states can levy 
independent VAT rates—a key requirement for accountability—a CVAT might be imposed 
by the central government on sales between states at some appropriate rate such as the 
weighted average of state rates (McLure 2000).  States would zero-rate both international and 
interstate sales but the latter would be subject to the central CVAT (as well as any central 
VAT, of course).  Domestic sales would thus be subject to central VAT and either state VAT 
or central CVAT.  There would be no need for any state to deal explicitly with any other state 
nor, generally, would there be any need for interstate clearing of tax credits.
52
  Registered 
purchasers in the other state would be able to credit CVAT against central VAT.   Since the 
central government, which first levies CVAT and then credits it, would gain no net revenue 
the effective rate of CVAT is zero.
53
   Since the state VAT applied to the resale by the 
purchaser would be that of the destination state, the results are exactly the same as in the 
                                                 
51
 A good tax administration could curb such abuse by issuing VAT refunds only for taxes actually collected by 
VAT registrants and only when exports are legitimate.  But few developing countries have such an administration.  
52
 This assumes that the state VAT rates are lower than the central rate.  If, as in Brazil, state rates are higher, there 
might be some residual need for a clearing-house—though on an aggregate, not transaction basis.  This would not be 
a problem if there is a unified administration of state VATs, although there are of course also arguments favoring 
separate administrations (see Mikesell 2007; Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev 2005).   
53
 As in Canada, the central government might receive an agreed fee for its services and, again as in Canada, some 
subsequent adjustments might be needed in subsequent periods (Bird and Gendron 2010). 
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Quebec VAT discussed earlier, with the CVAT serving to protect state revenues to some 
extent from fraud. 
  
Dual VAT 
 
The CVAT approach is more centralizing than the dual VAT.  In the dual VAT system in 
Canada the only VAT rate set centrally is that of the central government itself.  There is no 
need for any central edict with respect to state taxes applied to interstate trade since no such 
taxes are applied.  However, as Bird and Gendron (1998) emphasize, to function properly 
such a system appears to require both administrative competence and intergovernmental 
trust.  
 
Comparing Approaches 
 
Under VIVAT, a common rate is imposed by all states on sales to registered traders within 
the EU – that is, on B2B sales potentially giving rise to credits -- with member states being 
free to levy their own rates on B2C sales to consumers (or unregistered traders).  Not only 
does this proposal reduce state autonomy but it also requires precisely the sort of clearing 
mechanism to reconcile credits on imports and exports between member states that has often 
been proposed in the EU but has so far not come to fruition.  Under CVAT, the clearing 
mechanism may perhaps be less problematical because it would be done at the EU level.  
However, this presupposes that there is an EU level – that is, that not only do all states 
impose a common VAT rate on all sales to other EU member states but that the EU is 
responsible for collecting and accounting for this tax, with member states being responsible 
for setting the tax rates on final sales within each member state and administering that part of 
the tax system.    
 
Neither CVAT nor the dual VAT requires traders to identify the state of destination.
54
  In 
addition, neither requires any procedures to track and clear individual tax credits.  While 
even a dual VAT system may conceivably produce ‘excess’ credits, it seems less likely to do 
so than the CVAT because of the over-arching central VAT (McLure 2000).  In addition, 
unlike CVAT (which is a final tax for unregistered purchasers but a creditable tax for 
traders), the dual VAT does not require any distinction to be made between purchasers other 
than determining whether they are non-residents or not.
55
 Since CVAT is charged on all 
sales, a state’s revenue is less at risk than under the dual VAT approach, which places a 
heavier burden on the tax administration to ensure that those who should pay actually do so.  
                                                 
54
 All approaches do of course require a distinction between ‘out-of-state’ and ‘in-state’ sales (under VIVAT, in 
effect the ‘state’ is redefined as the EU with respect to sales between registrants). Although Bird and Gendron 
(1998) mentioned approvingly both the EU practice of requiring that the registration number of registered 
purchasers be quoted on the invoice and the possible desirability of including in this number some indication of the 
location of the purchaser, neither feature is strictly essential to the functioning of a dual VAT, as Canadian practice 
demonstrates.  Given the weaker tax administrations in most developing countries, however, such additional features 
might make sub-central VATs more feasible.   
55
 Although CVAT can do without this distinction if taxes on sales to unregistered traders are divided among 
jurisdictions in accordance with some formula, this approach would move the system closer to a revenue-sharing 
scheme.  
 Below the Salt: Decentralizing Value-Added Taxes 29 
In addition, while purists may not like it, the dual VAT’s greater tolerance for variation and 
the fact that it requires less agreement amongst the various governments concerned more 
readily accommodates the political compromises so often needed in intergovernmental 
finance.  
 
Two ways to achieve such cooperation in the EU are perhaps possible.   First, the EU already 
has at least as uniform a VAT structure for its member states as Canada does for its 
provinces.  What it does not have, however, is an overriding administrative structure that 
ensures that every member state has sufficient access to the information in the hands of other 
states to be able to prevent intra-community ‘missing trader’ and ‘carousel’ frauds in check.  
Substantial progress has already been made in this direction with uniform statistical reporting 
and increasingly also ‘real-time’ access enabling the verification of VAT registration status 
across borders, but more can obviously be done along these lines. Of course, moving the EU 
closer to a true ‘federation’ would, in addition to making it easier to solve the VAT 
administration issue, have the additional advantage in the eyes of some of making a coherent 
fiscal policy and something like equalization transfers more feasible.  But such a move 
would, it seems, be a ‘bridge too far’ for many Europeans.   
 
Second, as Bird and Gendron (1998) suggested, a ‘virtual’ EU VAT structure could be 
created.   Such a levy could be administered by the existing national administrations as a way 
of ‘backstopping’ the national VATs, more or less as the Quebec VAT is supported by 
Canada’s national GST.  The tax might be imposed at a zero rate (as in the CVAT proposal) 
or, say, at a 1 percent or other low rate to replace the present ‘EuroVAT’ levies used to 
support the EU.  Alternatively, it might be run by the European Commission or – perhaps 
more promising - by a special coordinating body established by participating member states 
which might also oversee a sort of EU revenue allocation system along the lines of the 
Canadian HST approach to sharing VAT revenues on a (statistically determined) destination 
basis.   
 
Whether further efforts in this direction are pushed or led from Brussels or come about 
through explicit inter-state agreements between different member state VAT administrations 
is an important, but secondary, question.  As Mochida, Horiba, and Mochizuki (2012) show 
in a recent detailed comparison of the dual VAT model with the present EU system, VIVAT 
and CVAT, on the whole it appears that that the Canadian approach is the most flexible, 
workable and efficient way yet developed to apply a sub-national VAT on a destination basis 
without border adjustment. 
 
Much the same can be said with respect to regional VATs in other settings.  In Brazil, for 
example, as in the EU, some (but not all) states have good tax administrations.  In addition, 
Brazil has both less commonality between the federal and state VATs and more variation 
among state VATs than either the EU or Canada.  When one adds to this mix the inadequate 
information exchange between state VAT administrations and between the federal and state 
administrations, many Brazilians seem to have concluded that it is probably easier to 
restructure the VAT system in the direction of an integrated federal-state VAT than to 
improve the administration of the existing VATs.  Although the CVAT approach was 
initially proposed in this setting, in the end, as Ter-Minassian (2012) has recently suggested, 
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it might prove both simpler and better to adopt a ‘dual VAT’ system on Canadian lines in 
Brazil as in the EU.   
    
 
4. Local Business VATs 
 
Local business taxes are found in many different forms are found around the world (Bird 
2003).  Such taxes are common not only because they produce substantial revenues for local 
governments but also because revenues from this source are generally more buoyant than 
those from the other main source of local tax revenue, the property tax.  Many local business 
taxes are essentially presumptive levies – under a variety of names, such as patente, 
professional tax, industry and commerce tax, single business fee – that distort production and 
allocative decisions.  Some such as octroi (domestic trade taxes) and gross receipts taxes that 
cascade down the production-distribution chain are particularly unpalatable in terms of their 
distorting effects.  Others, like business (corporate) income taxes are both difficult for local 
(and even state) governments to administer and may reduce the level of economic activity 
(McLure 1980).  
 
In some countries, as in Brazil and China, the major local revenue source is a tax on services 
which is not integrated with the national (or, in the case of Brazil, state) VAT: that is, it is a 
tax on gross receipts (sales revenue), not on value added. Brazil’s ISS is imposed on all 
services except communications and interstate and intercity public transportation, which are 
taxed by the state ICMS.  Generally, the ISS is a fixed percentage of retail sales although 
more presumptive methods of assessment are used in some cases.  National law fixes the 
minimum rate of the ISS at 2 percent as well as maximum rates that differ by the type of 
service, with the usual maximum being 5 percent of gross revenue.  The base of the ISS was 
expanded slightly a few years ago to include road tolls and the introduction of municipal 
public lighting fees (Afonso and Arajuo 2006).   
 
Since on the whole the ISS is poorly exploited by local governments, it has been argued that 
the only way to tax services more effectively is probably to abolish the ISS and incorporate 
services fully into a comprehensive value-added tax (Werneck 2008).  Presumably, national 
transfers to municipalities would be adjusted to offset their revenue loss.  A somewhat 
similar proposal in China to replace the existing percent local business tax by extending the 
national VAT to incorporate incorporating services is further advanced, having recently been 
adopted on a ‘pilot’ basis in Shanghai and several other provinces.56 
 
A Local Business “VAT” 
 
On the other hand, some countries that have recently examined their local business tax 
systems in depth have chosen to follow a quite different path by adopting what may be called 
a  local business “VAT” – called here a “business value tax” (BVT) in order to distinguish it 
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 This tax is imposed at a standard rate of 5 percent, with a lower rate of 3 percent on construction, transportation 
and some other services, and rates up to 20 percent on some entertainment activities (China 2012). 
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more clearly from the destination-based consumption VATs discussed earlier in this paper.
 57
   
The BVT is a flat-rate tax imposed on an accounts basis on the costs of the factors of 
production employed by a business, that is, on the difference between sales receipts and 
purchases from other businesses, that is, on value-added. Phrased differently, a BVT is in 
effect a local VAT that is imposed on production within a particular jurisdiction in contrast to 
the regional VATs discussed above which are (in principle, though not always in practice) 
imposed on the basis of consumption within the jurisdiction.  Table 5 provides a brief 
overview of some of the ‘VAT-like’ local business taxes currently in operation in a number 
of countries. Similar taxes have been proposed at various times in other countries such as 
Canada (Alberta 2000) and South Africa (Hunter van Ryneveld 2008), but not yet adopted.  
 
Local business taxes are invariably disliked by business but popular with both politicians and 
the general public.  Although such taxes are obviously most likely to be important in the 
largest cities where business activities are concentrated since these are also the local 
governments that most need revenues to accommodate growth and development it makes 
sense to give them business taxes that will grow with the city but are at the same time a more 
stable revenue source – and simpler to administer – than profits taxes.  Moreover, since 
businesses benefit, directly and indirectly, from many public expenditures an ideal business 
tax should also serve as a way of recapturing some of these benefits, most of which are more 
related to the size of business activities than to their profitability.  For these and other 
reasons, as Bird (2006) and Gandullia (2012) argue, there is much to be said for a local  
BVT. Over the years, such arguments have led a number of countries to follow this path to 
varying extents, as shown in Table 5.  
 
 
Germany  
 
The grandfather of all “value-added” local business taxes is the German trade tax, or 
gewerbesteuer.  As originally conceived, this tax was levied on the income of all factors of 
production, although it was not imposed in a very coherent fashion. As often happens, 
however, over the years the scope of the tax base was substantially eroded so that its value-
added nature has now essentially been lost. The payroll component of the base was abolished 
in 1980 and, since 1984, 50 percent of interest on “long-term” debts has been deducted from 
the base, thus not only creating an incentive to use more debt financing that varies across 
localities but also reducing the logical coherence of the tax. In 1997, the imputed value of 
buildings and equipment was also excluded from the tax base. Moreover, Germany has, in 
practice, essentially removed the tax from all but larger enterprises. 
 
From time to time, proposals have been made to restore something closer to the original 
conception of the trade tax in Germany.  Most local governments appear to have supported a 
federal proposal in 1982 to introduce an explicit local VAT, at an estimated rate of about 3 
percent, on top of the federal VAT. In contrast to the federal VAT, however, which is a 
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 This terminology was introduced by Bird and Mintz (2000).  Subsequently, Bird and McKenzie (2001) suggested 
that such a tax might replace the provincial corporate income tax in Canada, as did a later study in California, 
though again without success (Cline and Neubig 2010). 
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‘normal’ invoice-credit consumption-based tax, the proposed local tax was to be imposed on 
a net income  
Table 5 
VAT-Like Local Business Taxes 
Country Name of Tax Year 
introduced 
Rate Base Comments 
Italy  IRAP 
(imposta 
regional a 
sulle activita 
produttive) 
1998 3.9% Subtraction method; 
capital investment 
depreciated. 
Tax base is apportioned 
on the basis of labor 
costs. 
France Territorial 
economic 
contribution 
(contribution 
économique 
territoriale) 
2010 Up to 1.5% 
depending on 
size of 
turnover; no 
local 
discretion 
Subtraction method; 
equipment expensed, real 
estate depreciated 
Tax base is apportioned 
according to number of 
employees.  
Hungary HIPA 1990 Up to 2%, at 
local 
discretion 
Subtraction method but 
only costs of goods sold, 
material costs, and 
repackaged services 
deductible 
Tax base is apportioned 
(for larger taxpayers) by 
a weighted average of 
payroll or net assets. 
Japan Enterprise Tax 2004 0.48%, with 
some local 
discretion 
(e.g. rate in 
Tokyo is 
0.504%) 
Sum of wages, net 
interest paid, net rents 
paid, and taxable profits 
Applies to corporations 
with capital of more than 
100 million yen. 
US: 
Michigan 
Modified 
Gross Receipts 
Tax 
1953 1% This tax is applied by the 
subtraction method. Since 
exports are exempt and 
imports taxed, it is in 
effect on a destination 
basis. Most business 
purchases of goods (but 
not services) are 
effectively free of tax. 
A state rather than local 
tax. Originally 
introduced as BAT in 
1953; abolished in 1967; 
re-introduced as SBT in 
1975; replaced in 2007 
by present tax. Tax base 
is apportioned on the 
basis of sales. 
US: New 
Hampshire 
Business 
Enterprise Tax  
1993 0.5% This tax is origin-based, 
being calculated in effect 
by the addition method 
through the 
apportionment process.  
Tax base is apportioned 
by the state’s share of 
the taxpayer’s nation-
wide labor 
compensation, interest, 
and dividends.  It is 
creditable against the 
state corporate income 
tax 
US: Texas Margin Tax 2007   Up to 1% 
depending on 
size of 
turnover. 
Applied on the least of 
three bases, ranging from 
70 percent of gross 
receipts to a quasi-VAT 
base of revenue less than 
cost of goods sold 
Base is apportioned for 
multistate businesses on 
basis of sales. 
Sources: Bird (2003), Gilbert (2010a), Luna, Murray, and Yang (2012), Japan Ministry of Finance (2010), and 
Neubig, Cline and Dauchy (2010). 
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origin basis and, preferably, to be collected by the addition method (that is, on the sum of 
payroll, interest, rents, and net profits). In the end, however, that proposal was not accepted, 
owing largely to business opposition to paying taxes when firms had no profits.  
 
In part precisely because the tax was overly sensitive to economic cycles, a later federal 
Commission for Reform of Municipal Finances again considered possible revisions of the 
trade tax. Local governments prefer a more ‘input-oriented’ tax (like an income VAT) 
because it yields more stable revenues. On the other hand, businesses prefer a more profit-
oriented levy as reflecting more their ‘true income.’ To date, no changes have been made in 
either direction, and the largely unreformed ‘trade tax’ continues to be not only a mainstay of 
local finance in Germany but “the undisputed dominant corporate tax in Germany” because 
of the substantial revenue it produces, even when few or no corporate income taxes are paid 
(Kessler and Eicke 2007, 283). 
 
The United States 
 
Michigan. After Germany, it appears that the next sub-central ‘business’ VAT was that 
introduced in the state of Michigan in 1953 under the name of the Business Activities Tax 
(BAT). This state (not local) tax was imposed on the difference between a firm’s gross 
receipts and its payments to other firms: in effect, it was a source-based, subtraction-method, 
income VAT (Hines 2003).  Although the initial tax rate was only 0.4 percent, it rose to 0.75 
percent before the tax was abolished in 1967 and replaced by a corporate income tax (CIT).   
 
In 1975, however, Michigan again returned to the VAT model replacing the CIT by a new 
Single Business Tax (SBT) initially at a rate of 2.35 percent.  The SBT was again essentially 
a modified VAT, although this time computed through the addition method and measured on 
the income side as the sum of payments to labor and capital.
58
 All persons engaged in 
business activity were subject to SBT if gross receipts exceed $350,000. The tax was 
computed annually on the basis of net income as reported for federal tax purposes, adjusted 
by adding such items as compensation, depreciation, and partnership losses and then 
deducting such items as dividends, interest and royalty income, and partnership income.  
SBT was payable on an estimated quarterly basis.  Business investments in real property 
were fully deductible from the SBT tax base as were investments in other property 
(equipment) considered located in Michigan.  The tax base of multistate enterprises was 
apportioned on the basis of a formula that weighted the location of business property and 
payrolls equally. 
 
The SBT stabilized state revenues compared to the notoriously volatile corporate income tax. 
It also reduced the distortionary effect of state business taxes by extending the tax base to 
encompass business organized in other than the corporate form.  Moreover, it was easier to 
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 Kleine (2008) suggests that the additive approach was one reason for the unpopularity of the SBT because it led to 
claims that companies were penalized for increasing employment; on the other hand, Arnold and Ardinger (2004) 
assert that the additive approach adopted in New Hampshire is one of the main strengths of that state’s BET 
(discussed below) owing to the simplicity with which it could be computed and administered on the basis of the 
same information used for the state corporate income tax. 
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administer than the CIT.  Although political pressures complicated the design of the SBT, 
Hines (2003) concluded that the tax was essentially sound in its design from an economic 
perspective. Since most new investments essentially escaped tax, much of the tax burden fell 
on economic rent such as “the excess profitability of local manufacturing, high-tech an other 
firms, the value of Michigan land, and the extent to which Michigan wages exceed 
competitive levels” (Hines 2003).  
 
However, there was considerable business opposition to the tax largely because many 
businesses, particularly smaller ones, did not see why they should have to pay tax when they 
had no profits.  As a result, over time more and more concessions of various sorts were 
introduced, making the tax more complex. Since the ‘benefit’ argument for the SBT was 
never prominent in Michigan, as the base of the SBT became more eroded – in part in an 
attempt to offset the declining auto sector -- the tax came to be both excessively complex and 
unpopular. In 1999 its rate was reduced to 2.2 percent, with further annual decreases of 0.1 
percent scheduled to take place until the tax was eliminated in 2020.  Subsequent state 
revenue problems altered this schedule, however, and in 2002 it was decided that the then 
rate of 1.9 percent would be maintained until 2009, when the tax would be eliminated.   
 
In reality, however, what happened was that a new tax called the “modified gross receipts 
tax” (MGRT) was imposed (with some other taxes) to replace the SBT in 2007.  As McIntyre 
and Pomp (2009) accurately note, this new tax is not all that different from its predecessor(s) 
since it too is essentially an “apportioned” value-added tax, that is, one based on the factor 
costs (value-added) ‘apportioned’ to Michigan firms.  In contrast to the SBT, however, this 
latest incarnation of Michigan’s long-standing VAT is imposed on a destination and not an 
origin basis – that is, on imports but not exports – at a rate of 1 percent. 
 
New Hampshire. Michigan’s long experience with various state VAT-like taxes has been 
emulated to a limited extent by a few other states.  In particular, New Hampshire’s Business 
Enterprise Tax (BET) is also an ‘apportioned’ VAT like that now in place in Michigan, 
although its base is determined by a more complex formula than the simple sales 
apportionment rule used in Michigan.  Like the Michigan SBT the base of the BET is 
determined additively as the state’s share of the taxpayer’s nation-wide labor compensation, 
interest, and dividends and is hence origin-based.  Since BET is imposed at a low rate (0.5 
percent) it is thought unlikely to create any significant disincentives for business use of 
capital and labor in the state.  Indeed, like Michigan’s current MGRT, it is probably lower 
than a real ‘business benefit’ tax to pay for the cost of public services provided to business, 
which on average in the US appears to be closer to 2 percent (Oakland and Testa 2000). 
Although several studies have argued that New Hampshire’s BET provides at least a useful 
supplement to state corporate income taxes (Kenyon 1996) and perhaps a useful replacement 
for such taxes (Arnold and Ardinger 2004) as yet no other state has followed this model. A 
recent report in California, however, recommended that the California state corporate income 
tax should be replaced by a “business net receipts tax” which is in effect a VAT levied on an 
entity basis (Cline and Neubig 2010).   Unlike the other BVTs discussed here, however, the 
California proposal would have allowed some deductions for imports and taxed some exports 
and hence been a mixed (origin-destination) based tax. 
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A few other states have also introduced some elements of a local business VAT into their tax 
systems in recent years. Notably, Texas introduced a new ‘margin tax’ in 2006 that imposes a 
tax at a maximum rate of 1 percent on a base determined as the least of three calculations – 
total sales revenue minus cost of goods sold; total revenue minus compensation; or 70 
percent of total revenue (Sullivan 2008).
59
  Although the first of these bases allows the 
deduction of labor costs in the production of goods (not for service delivery) and does not 
allow deduction for the purchases of services from other firms, this tax is, like that in 
Michigan, a modified gross receipts tax that approaches a subtraction-based VAT.  As in 
Michigan, for multistate businesses the base is apportioned by sales.  Kentucky and New 
Jersey use a somewhat similar gross margin approach (revenue less cost of goods sold) as an 
alternative minimum tax to the corporate income tax.  Most recently, Oklahoma in 2010 
introduced a Business Activity Tax which again combines elements of a gross receipts tax 
with a subtraction method VAT (Luna, Murray and Yang 2012). However, this tax was 
repealed in 2012. 
 
Hungary 
 
In Hungary the local business tax (HIPA) is levied at a locally determined rate of up to a 
maximum of 2 percent on a VAT-like base (sales revenue, excluding VAT, less the cost of 
goods sold, costs of materials, and cost of subcontractors).   The tax has been criticized both 
for favoring in-house production and because there are many discretionary exemptions.
60
  
The obvious reality that any local business tax is going to be more productive in richer than 
in poorer regions has also given rise to criticism, Moreover, because the tax base is 
calculated on a very different basis than the corporate income tax, it is expensive to 
administer (Szalai and Tassonyi 2004).  Nonetheless, HIPA remains the most important 
single source of local government revenue and, like Italy’s IRAP (see below), its legality has 
recently been reaffirmed by the European Court of Justice (Erdos 2009). 
 
Italy 
 
Perhaps the most important modern move to a local VAT took place in Italy in 1998, when a 
new business tax -- the imposta regional a sulle activita produttive (IRAP) -- replaced an 
existing regional income tax levied on business income as well as some other small taxes. 
The IRAP is essentially a net income-type VAT on an origin basis. IRAP’s base is calculated 
annually as the difference between gross receipts (sales revenues) and the cost of 
intermediate goods and services (purchases from other firms plus depreciation). There are 
specific rules for different types of financial institutions. Neither wages and salaries, nor 
interest payments, are deductible from the tax base. Outlays for capital goods are deducted in 
accordance with normal income tax depreciation schedules. Revenues are allocated among 
regions in proportion to labor costs incurred in each region. Most firms, including all types of 
business and self-employed activities, were initially subjected to IRAP at 4.25 percent, 
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 Businesses with revenue below $300,000 are exempt, and the rate then increases in steps from 0.2 percent on 
those between $300,000 and $400,000 to 1 percent for those with revenues over $900,000 (except for retail and 
wholesale trade, where the maximum rate is only 0.5 percent, with a similar graduated system). 
60
 Until 2003, local governments could give such exemptions although this is no longer the case. 
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although regional governments may choose to levy an additional percentage point. This tax 
finances about one-quarter of all regional spending in Italy.  
 
In principle, IRAP is neutral with respect both to the choice of organizational form and 
between equity and debt financing.  In practice, however, an early study found that, on 
balance, it favored capital over labor because tax depreciation exceeded economic 
depreciation (Bordignon, Gianni, and Panteghini 2001).
61
  One motivation for the initial 
adoption of IRAP was to bring Italian profit taxes closer to those in other European Union 
countries.  For the same reason, in 2003 the national government decided to eliminate the tax, 
following the old German model of ‘salami tactics’ (slice by slice) by beginning with the 
exclusion of 20 percent of labor costs from the base.  However, it was left unclear how this 
essential source of regional finance would be replaced (Keen 2003).  Despite several 
subsequent moves by the central government to go further in the direction of abolishing the 
tax, however, as yet the IRAP continues to exist, perhaps largely because no similarly 
productive source of regional finance has been suggested as a substitute. Although a 2008 
law allowed regions to set the rate and even to some extent to alter the base, it was never 
implemented (Longobardi 2013).  Similarly, a 2011 law both gave regions more discretion in 
setting IRAP rates and provided that IRAP revenues should be distributed on a destination 
basis beginning in 2013, on the basis of the information on the location of final consumers 
that is required on existing IRAP returns.  In addition, regional revenue was to be distributed 
to municipalities on a per capita basis, although as yet these changes have not been 
implemented.   
 
Several decisions by Advocates-General of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) determined 
that the IRAP was not acceptable under EU rules because its ‘VAT-like’ characteristics mean 
that it is in fact a VAT and hence precluded under the Sixth VAT Directive.  These decisions 
were strongly criticized, however (Cnossen 2006), and in 2007 the ECJ unusually decided 
not to accept the decisions of its Advocates-General, ruling that the IRAP was sufficiently 
distinct from the VAT to be acceptable.  Despite this legal victory, the then Italian 
government again said it intended to abolish the tax and began this time by reducing the basic 
IRAP rate from 4.25to 3.9 percent.  Although taxpayers dislike the tax because it has to be 
paid even by non-profitable businesses and most political parties seem to want to abolish or 
at least reform it (Longobardi 2013), the IRAP continues to survive.   
  
Japan 
 
Although Japan is in most ways a highly unified country, it has a complex system of local 
government and a long tradition of local autonomy.  Japan has 47 regional governments, or 
prefectures, with populations ranging from 12 million (Tokyo) to a little over 600,000.  In 
addition, it has about 2,500 municipalities (cities, towns, villages).  Both levels of local 
government have a broad range of functions (including education) and independently levy 
and collect many different taxes.   
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 An interesting recent comparison between IRAP and CBIT, a comprehensive business tax originally proposed in 
US Treasury (1992) which essentially taxes the same base but allows the deduction of labor cost found that IRAP 
was more contractionary (see also Joumard and Yokahama (2005) on Japan) but that CBIT was more regressive 
(Manza and Monteduro 2010). 
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The main local tax on business is called the Enterprise Tax.
62
 It is imposed on both 
corporations and on individuals engaged in a wide range of specified activities (including 
professional activities), although many primary sector (farming, forestry, mining, etc.) 
activities are exempted even if carried on by corporations.  Japan’s regional governments 
(prefectures) have long imposed Enterprise Tax on most non-agricultural businesses, 
generally on the basis of income as computed for the national corporation tax (CIT).  The 
base attributable to the prefectures in which any taxpayer had places of operation was 
determined by prorating the total tax base (for example, as reported for national CIT) usually 
on the basis of the number of employees. Even when the Enterprise Tax was based on 
income, the local tax base was not identical to that of the CIT, being more narrowly defined 
in some respects and more broadly defined in others in an attempt to link the tax burden more 
closely to the benefits provided business by local governments. The standard local Enterprise 
Tax rate was set nationally with rates varying with taxable income up to a maximum of 9.6 
percent applicable to enterprises with offices in more than three prefectures and capital of 
more than 10 million, regardless of its taxable income. Prefectural governments collect the 
tax and may, it they wish to do so, impose rates up to 120 percent of the standard rates.
63
  
 
An alternative gross receipts tax of 1.3 percent was long used for electricity, gas and 
insurance companies, and prefectures were free to use such other bases such as the number of 
employees or the amount of capital if they wished to do so.  Owing to Japan’s prolonged 
recession in recent decades, an increasing number of companies on the taxable income basis 
reported persistent losses and hence paid no Enterprise Tax.  To offset the loss of local 
revenue a new form of local business tax was introduced in 2005 for corporations with 
capital greater than 100 million yen.  The principal reason for this change was to make the 
local business tax base less sensitive to economic fluctuations.  In addition, it was argued that 
the new tax would better reflect the intended purpose of local benefit taxation by ensuring 
that every company using local public services paid taxes whether it made profits or not. This 
new tax base for larger enterprises has three components: income, value added, and capital, 
but the key element in the new tax base is value added, defined as the sum of salaries, net 
interest paid, net rent paid, plus (or minus) profit (or loss) in the year.  However, if wage 
compensation in a year exceeds 70 percent of the total, the excess is deducted. This tax base 
is subject to a flat tax of 0.48 percent.  In addition, a Capital Tax is levied on paid-up capital 
(amounts invested and capital surplus) at a rate of 0.20 percent.  The rates of the income tax 
component were lowered for enterprises subject to these new levies, with a maximum rate of 
7.2 percent.  As before, prefectures are allowed, if they wish, to impose rates up to 120 
percent of the standard rates: a few, such as Tokyo, do so.  As with all local taxes on business 
these taxes are deductible from taxable income for purposes of calculating national corporate 
income tax.   
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 Most of the information in this section is based on Bird (2006) updated by Local Autonomy College (2008) and to 
the extent possible by information available as of January 2013 on webpages of Japan Ministry of Finance, Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Communications and other sources.  
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 Although an official study proposed that, apart from the property tax, all other local taxes should be administered 
by the National Tax Administration (Japan Research Institute 2006), the system has not been changed.  
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In sharp contrast to most of the other cases discussed here, in Japan the principle of local 
‘benefit’ taxation of local business is formally acknowledged as the key argument shaping 
the form of local business taxation.  Since businesses make use of such services as roads, 
ports, health services, pollution control, etc. it is argued that they should make a contribution 
to cover the cost of services and that the appropriate base for this contribution should be 
related to the scale of their business activities.  The VAT component of the local Enterprise 
Tax is considered to be the best approximation to a benefit-related charge. A second virtue, 
as noted also in other countries, is that this approach makes local revenues more stable.  
However, no tax is perfect, and Joumard and Yokoyama (2005) note, first, although 
excluding small businesses reduces the potential burden on newly-created companies with 
few or no profits this exclusion breaches the rationale of benefit taxation and, second, that 
although VAT reduces the volatility of local revenues, it does so by shifting some cyclical 
risk to firms and hence may exacerbate business failures during downturns.   
 
France 
 
France has long had a local business tax in the form of the taxe professionnelle. The base of 
this tax was essentially the rental value of a company’s equipment plus its wage bill.  In 
response to the argument that this base adversely affected employment, the payroll tax 
component was first reduced and then, in 2003, abolished, with the loss of local revenues 
being offset by increased central government transfers. The Fouquet Commission (2004) 
recommended that a new local business tax should be gradually implemented to replace the 
taxe professionnelle. After considering a wide range of alternatives, the Commission favored 
a form of value-added tax as the most economically effective, balanced, and equitable form 
of local business taxation.  Business income taxes were felt to be too volatile a revenue 
source and to be insufficiently closely related to the costs borne by local authorities owing to 
business activities in their jurisdiction. Value added was said to provide both a more stable 
base and one that taxed all factors of production more evenly.   
 
Although some technical problems were noted, particularly with respect to the financial 
sector, the Commission argued that they were no greater than those with other forms of 
taxation and were not insurmountable.  In fact, they favored the value-added basis in part on 
administrative grounds because in practice it had been used for several decades in calculating 
the taxe professionnelle.   For taxpayers whose turnover exceeded 7.6 million Euros for 
whom the ‘normal’ tax base was less than 1.5 percent of value added, a minimal contribution 
was imposed to bring the tax to this level, and for those whose calculated taxes exceeded a 
certain share of value-added (3.5 - 4 percent, depending on turnover), taxes were limited to 
this level, so that in reality in 2003 over half the tax was actually calculated on a value-added 
basis. The major technical problem relates to the allocation to different jurisdictions, and the 
Commission suggested that the number of employees, the wage bill, and the rental value of 
land were the sorts of factors that should be considered in this connection.  With respect to 
rates, the Commission favored some, but not unrestricted, local freedom to set rates within 
limits. 
 
In reality, however, the only reform introduced in the taxe professionnelle in 2006 was to 
create a single ceiling of 3.5 percent of a firm’s declared value added beginning in 2007.  
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One reason why so little was done was reportedly because of the then recent adverse 
decisions of the European Court of Justice with respect to the Italian IRAP, mentioned above.  
A few years later, however, France proceeded to introduce a new local business tax with a 
pronounced VAT flavor in 2010 when the taxe professionnelle was replaced by the 
‘economic territorial contribution’ (Gilbert 2010).   This new tax has two components -- one 
based on the annual rental value of real property used for business purposes and the other on 
value added, defined as the difference between turnover (gross receipts) and the cost of 
goods and services used in the business.  A tax of 1.5 percent is imposed on this value added, 
although those with turnover less than EUR 50 million benefit progressively from partial 
relief until the tax vanishes at the EUR 500,000 level.  Half of the proceeds of the local VAT 
go to the departments, and the remainder is divided, roughly equally, between the regions 
and municipalities (Beltrame 2011).
64
 
 
 
BVTs and VATs 
 
Another way of looking at the local business VAT is to consider how it relates to the central 
(or regional VAT).  While there are, as discussed above, many possible varieties of such 
taxes, in general BVTs differ from VATs in a number of important ways: 
 
 BVT is imposed within a clearly-defined territorial area that is also subject to the 
‘normal’ VAT. 
 BVT is calculated on the basis of accounts (through addition or subtraction) and not 
based by the transaction-based invoice-credit method. 
 BVT is clearly a tax on business activities and not a form of sales tax. 
 BVT taxes production rather than consumption and is hence based on origin not 
destination. 
 BVT is imposed on a gross or net income basis rather than on consumption. 
 BVT is usually applied to all business activities with no thresholds or exemptions. 
 
Although the base of the BVT is territorially limited, it is thus inherently wider than the base 
of the VAT in a number of respects.  In fact, viewed from the perspective of the VAT, the 
BVT may be seen as one of a number of local taxes that may play a useful role in offsetting 
some VAT exclusions.  Just as local property taxes may offset some of the potentially 
distorting effects of the relatively favorable treatment of housing in most VATs, local BVTs 
may offset some of the effects of the limited extent to which most VATs reach small business 
activities especially in the service sector. Indeed, some local business taxes, like Brazil’s ISS 
and China’s Business Tax, are explicitly intended to tax services that are not subject to the 
VAT. 
                                                 
64
 The French system is considerably more complex than this brief summary indicates.  For example, there is a limit 
on the combined effective rate with respect to value-added of 3 percent for the total of the two components of the 
LBT (the BVT and the locally-determined business property tax) and there is also a convergence process that both 
limits changes in the business tax rate and ensures that the rates within the new ‘federative’ inter-municipal 
structures become uniform over time in order to reduce local tax competition (Gilbert 2012).  For enterprises 
operating in more than one locality, the VAT tax base as calculated from the company accounts is allocated among 
localities essentially on the basis of employment (Gilbert 2010a). 
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Given the poor design and operation of many local business taxes (LBT), it may be possible 
to improve both VAT and LBT by combining the two.  This can be done in a number of very 
different ways.  The simplest way is to abolish LBT, include all services in VAT base, and 
then presumably provide an offsetting transfer to make up the revenue loss to local 
governments.  However, this solution obviously both reduces local fiscal autonomy and 
makes local governments even more reliant on continued transfers from higher-level 
authorities.  Particularly in developing countries – as India’s experience with replacing the 
local octroi by grants illustrates -- such transfers have not always provided adequate or timely 
compensation for the loss of what is usually the most elastic local revenue source (Bird 
2006). 
 
Another approach might be to abolish LBT and include all services in the central VAT, but to 
allow local governments to impose (perhaps within some range of rates) a uniform local 
surcharge on the national (or regional) VAT tax or, more directly, a uniform local 
supplementary rate to be collected by the higher level tax agency on behalf of the local 
government.
65
  Local authorities may be enthusiastic about this approach which promises to 
give them access to an important source of revenue at relatively little political or 
administrative cost.  Such a system exists in Japan, where the ‘local consumption tax’ (25 
percent of the collections of the central VAT) is allocated to prefectures (the higher level of 
local government in Japan) 75 percent on the basis of estimated territorial consumption, 12.5 
percent on the number of employees and 12.5 percent on population.  Prefectures in turn are 
then required to allocate 50 percent of their share to their municipalities, giving equal weight 
in doing so to the last two of these factors (Mochida, Horiba, and Mochizuki 2012).  
Although this study concludes that a better way to distribute the revenues would be by 
following what they call the ‘Canadian model’ of macro-revenue allocation (as described 
briefly in Section 2 above), they do not consider the other key feature of that model – 
provincial rate discretion – which would make little sense in the context of Japanese local 
government and should indeed likely be ruled out completely at the local level in any country 
because of the very considerable complexity, costs and distortions that might be incurred if 
hundreds or even thousands of local governments got into the VAT act.
66
     
 
Of course, as already discussed, Japan also has a local (origin-based) business VAT, which 
appears to work well despite the existence of the local (destination-based) consumption tax. 
A similar approach might perhaps be used in countries such as China and Brazil, both of 
which are currently attempting (or considering attempting) to incorporate all local taxes on 
business services into the VAT, if they wish to retain and strengthen local fiscal autonomy 
and responsibility.  Local governments might, for instance, impose a local BVT making use 
of some of the information collected in the process of normal VAT administration as the 
basis for such a tax, which could then be administered either locally or nationally as was 
recently suggested for South Africa (Hunter and Van Reyneveld 2008). 
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 Any such local tax should likely be at a uniform rate both for administrative feasibility and in order to restrain 
attempts through differential rates to attract tax base or to export tax burdens. 
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The problem of how to deal with the thousands of existing local sales taxes in the United States has been a major 
concern in considering the possible introduction of a consumption VAT in that country: for discussions, see Duncan 
(2010) and McLure (2010). 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The various country stories told in this paper are diverse and heavily influenced by their 
particular context and timing.  Nonetheless, three conclusions emerge from this complex tale 
of what has been going on ‘below the salt’ with respect to value-added taxation.   
 
First, regional VATs can and do work, and in the right circumstances, work well. In 
particular, Canada’s ‘dual VAT’ experience with a broad-based central VAT and provincial 
VATs administered together – whether at the central or the regional level – shows that a 
destination-based sub-central VAT which handles interjurisdictional trade essentially by the 
deferred payment method long in force in the EU can work well, at least in a developed 
country with a good central tax, good administration and good cooperation between 
governments.   
 
Secondly, if Quebec and Canada with their long and turbulent history over the years (Bird 
and Vaillancourt 2006) can work together in their mutual interest to develop a workable 
regional VAT system perhaps it may be possible for common markets and specifically the 
EU to find some similar cooperative way to develop an integrated VAT administrative 
system while permitting member states to retain significant control over both their tax rates 
and their tax collections.   
 
Thirdly, although the evidence is less convincing, experience in Italy, Japan and France 
demonstrates that a local tax based essentially on value-added on a origin basis may not only 
be a sensible way of charging business for benefits obtained from local public spending but 
may also administered adequately at the local level with no serious economic costs and some 
benefits in terms of improving the stability of local revenues. Given the apparently increasing 
dependence of countries on urban-based ‘engines of growth’ more countries should perhaps 
consider allowing some access by at least larger cities (and perhaps regions) to the value-
added tax base through the parallel track of local business VATs. 
 
 As yet no country other than Japan has imposed both a regional (destination) ‘consumption 
VAT’ and a local (origin) ‘business VAT’, although the Brazilian system may perhaps also 
evolve in this direction.  Nor has any country yet used the national VAT (and payroll tax) 
administration to provide the basic administrative data for a local BVT as was recently 
suggested in South Africa (Hunter and Van Ryneveld 2008).  Again, however, it is perhaps 
possible that the on-going Chinese experiment may perhaps evolve in this direction.  
Whether it does or not, it is clear is that – as indeed the Meade report (IFS 1998) implicitly 
noted long ago in a different context – there is nothing inherently illogical or inconsistent 
about imposing VAT on one basis (origin) as a local business tax and on another basis 
(destination) as a national (and/or regional) consumption tax. 
 
Since VAT is now the key to sound national finance in many countries central governments 
have understandably been reluctant to give up control over this tax.  However, if sub-central 
governments have important expenditure responsibilities, both experience and theory suggest 
that they are more likely to exercise those responsibilities sensibly if they are also responsible 
for raising a significant amount of their own revenues, especially at the margin (Bird 2011).  
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At the sub-central level, as at the central level, the VAT option may in some circumstances 
be attractive.  Indeed, as already discussed such subnational VATs are already critically 
important to subnational finance in countries as diverse as Brazil, Canada and India.  It can 
be done.  It has been done.   
 
The question is thus not whether it is possible to run a two-level VAT but rather what lessons 
have been learned from these experiences about how any country that decides to pursue this 
option can best do it.  When applied to the common market setting (as in the EU) the 
question is whether member states are willing to work together administratively closely 
enough to close the gaps that have been opened by the absence of an overriding common 
market VAT. Moreover, since theory and to some extent experience suggests that a quite 
different kind of VAT may provide a more economically sensible form of local business 
taxation than those now found in most countries, some countries may in the future even end 
up with three VATs – a destination-based consumption VAT at both the central and regional 
levels and an origin-based business VAT at the local level -- although as yet no country has 
yet reached this point.   
 
In conclusion, it is important to emphasize that this paper does not argue that sub-central 
VAT of either the destination or origin variety are always or necessarily a good choice even 
in federal countries with important sub-central governments.  Indeed, a better case may often 
be made even in such countries for following the Swiss pattern and leaving the VAT entirely 
to the central government  while perhaps allowing sub-central governments (on the 
Scandinavian model) to levy a personal income tax, preferably on a uniform national base. 
What this paper does argue, however, is simply that, if some countries choose to introduce 
such sub-central VATs (of either variety), not only are there are no serious technical reasons 
why they cannot do so but there may be economic gains from introducing less distorting sub-
central sales and business taxes than now exist.  Moreover, there may be some useful lessons 
that the European Union (or other common markets) can learn from the varied experiences in 
the subterranean world of sub-central VATs that have been discussed in this paper.    
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